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I. INTRODUCTION
As 1983 approaches its conclusion, King Hassan II in
Morocco appears firmly implanted as that nation's dominant
political institution. However, many of Hassan's critics
argue that the monarchy's traditional hold on the country
.
is weakening. As evidence, they point to the severe social,
economic, and political upheavals that have confronted
Hassan since his accession to power following the death of
his father, Mohammed V in 19 61.
Hassan narrowly escaped assassination in attempted Coups
d'etat in 19 71 and 19 72; and for several years now pundits
have been speculating on how much longer he will be able to
hold on to his throne. These same critics argue that the
assassination attempts do not point to stability or indicate
a great love by Moroccans for its monarch.
Other skeptics point out that Morocco is beset by an in-
creasing deficit, terrible poverty, high unemployment, a
huge gap between rich and poor, an out-of-control birth
rate, and blatant corruption, certainly not the sort of
problems one man can handle alone.
Finally, opponents of Hassan's regime contend that
monarchial rule is too obsolete and inefficient form of
government to survive in the world. Educational barriers are
being torn down and communication networks developed to the
extent that no nation need accept domination by a single
ruler simply because 'it does not know better 1' His critics
point out that Hassan has realized this and, in response, has
sought to adapt his regime to meet these pressures by allow-
ing a controlled constitutional system with competing politi-
cal parties to develop.
However, Hassan's rule continues despite these prophecies
of doom. In fact his supporters contend that Hassan and the
monarchy have never been more powerful or popular in Morocco.
Morocco's growing ties with the west, evidenced by the mas-
sive military and economic aid he is receiving from the French
and more importantly the United States, provides the government
with a means of meeting the demands of the poor and unemployed.
These ties have served to legitimize the monarchy and boost
its popular support. In an area of the world where violence
and political unrest is a way of life, Morocco, is relatively
secure from external threats. This is due in part to its
geographic location, but mainly to its possession of the most
modern military equipment the world has to offer. Consequently,
the average Moroccan citizen feels relatively secure; and
attributes his security to the monarchy.
Other supporters of the monarchy argue that Hassan will
survive because of the historical centrality of the monarchy.
There has been a monarch in Morocco for over twelve centuries.
As the seventeenth in a line of Alawite (family name) Moslems
who have ruled over Morocco since 1666, but more importantly,
the most current in a line of monarchs that have ruled there
since the eighth century, Hassan's historical and traditional
right to rule has been firmly established in the hearts and
minds of the Moroccan people. For this reason, the monarchy
is not likely to be supplanted by another form of rule
overnight.
And What of Islam? As in other devout Muslim countries
this religion has a firm grasp on the economic, social, and
political activities of the Moroccan people. To Moroccans,
the prime symbol of Islamic values and tradition is the
monarch, who claims to be a direct descendent of the Prophet.
This gives Hassan a strong base from which to maintain his
rule
.
Both critics and supporters alike then, appear to have
considerable basis for arguments as to the effects that pres-
sures, brought about by political change, have had on the
institution and stability of the monarch. While political
change, either forced or freely instituted, has been a reality
of Moroccan politics for as long as there has been a monarchy
itself, it has had a varied effect. The purpose of this study
is to determine the effects of political change on the monarchy
by addressing three broad questions: What is the essence of
the traditional monarchy to include its dominant institutions
and guiding principles; how have modern pressures affected
the stability of the monarchy; and how do current challenges
to the monarch affect prospects for future change? This
endeavor will be undertaken in three parts.
Part One will examine the traditional monarchy prior to
the rise of the Moroccan nationalist movement which had
beginnings as early as 1920 but saw its actual cohesion after
the fall of France in 194 0. This movement was a watershed
for political change in Morocco. The purpose of focusing on
the pre-nationalist Moroccan state is to examine a system
that went virtually unchanged for over a thousand years. Its
origins, guiding principles, and dominant institutions will
be analyzed as a means to better understanding the foundations
of the thinking process and actions of the monarchy today.
Part Two will focus on the post-1940 monarchy with emphasis
given to the occurrences that created pressures for change in
the traditional political system. Modernization, the national-
ist movement- and decolonization each created pressures for
change, and the effects of these pressures on the post-
independence Moroccan political system to include a brief
account of each political party and its relationship to the
monarchy will be discussed with the purpose of showing rela-
tive strengths and weakness of each organization as compared
to those of the monarchy. This is a particularly important
part of the study in that it will hopefully provide the infor-
mation necessary to determine political and socio-economic
changes that have occurred and their resultant effects on the
station of the monarchy, and along with an analysis of the
nature of current challenges to the monarchy in Morocco, to
include the key issues and monarchial response to those
10
issues, will make a determination as to the actual level of
influence the monarchy maintains in the politics of Morocco
Finally, speculation on its likelihood of continuance will
conclude the essay.
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II. THE MQNARCHIAL TRADITION IN MOROCCO: PRE-19 40
Morocco is both an ancient kingdom and an emerging country
It is one of the world's oldest states, by virtue of its con-
tinuous 1200-year history of controlling it own political
affairs. Now, .as an emerging nation whose interests have
become global, Moroccans are proud of their country's history
and in its role as the center of a political force that at
various times controlled much of North African and Spain.
Morocco was able to avoid falling under the domination of the
Ottoman Empire, unlike the rest of the Maghrib (Arabic mean-
ing "the west," and which includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia
and sometimes Libya) . In perspective, the relatively brief
period of the French and Spanish protectorate (1912-56)
,
during which resistance of separate tribes to this outside
intervention was followed by the Moroccan Nationalist move-
ment, should be viewed as only a brief occurrence in Morocco's
actually long history.
In similar fashion, the institution of the monarchy was
affected only slightly by the French protectorate, and in
actuality increased the popularity of the Alawite dynasty that
had ruled Morocco since the seventeenth century. It is the
world's oldest reigning royal house. In mid 19 83, Hassan II,
the current monarch, ruled in a fashion apparently as tradi-
tional and authoritarian as that of his predecessors, although
12
in a modernized style, and he continued to command the loyalty
and apparent veneration of a decisive majority of the popula-
tion. This will be developed in greater detail in later
portions of this paper.
The purpose of this section of the study is to determine
the essence of the traditional monarchial rule in Morocco
prior to 1940. First, by tracing its origins, and then out-
lining his dominant institutions and guiding principles.
This will serve as a backdrop for the succeeding parts of the
paper which will examine the political changes that have
occurred since 1940 and their effects on the position of the
monarchy. 1940 has been chosen as the watershed year for
political change in Morocco for two reasons. One, the French
fell to Germany during that year in World War II and second,
1940 marked the beginnings of a rapid rise of political
parties in the country causing ultimately, the demise of
the French Protectorate in 19 56.
A. ORIGINS
1 . Pre-dynastic Rule
Prior to the rise of the three Berber and two Sharifan
dynasties that ruled over Morocco from early in the eleventh
century until the present, Morocco as a nation; a unified
state; was non-existent. The borders of the country were
relatively defined but the populace was not grouped into any
large community espousing a theme of a united Morocco and as
such, enjoyed no central authority. The Berber, the primary
13
race to inhabit Morocco at that time had no concept of
Nationhood despite their habitation of the area for over
2,000 years [Ref. 1]. They referred to themselves simply as
' imazighan,' to which has been attributed the meaning "free
men" [Ref. 2] . But the Berbers identified themselves entirely
with their separate tribes, and Berbers from other tribes
were as much foreigners to them as were the Arabs who came
later. As such, a better understanding of the Berber peoples
is necessary before continuing with the analysis of the system
of pre-dynastic rule in Morocco.
The origin of the Berbers is a mystery. Investigation
has produced an abundance of educated speculation, but evi-
dence is not sufficient to support a definitive solution.
Some pieces of the puzzle can be fitted together, however.
Archaeological and linguistic evidence indicates southwestern
Asia, a great breeding ground of tribes and nations, as the
point from which the ancestors of the Berbers began their
movement into North Africa. Berber tradition told that they
were descended from two unrelated families; and scholars be-
lieve that the Berbers crossed North Africa in two simultaneous
waves, one from the southwest that entered the region after
a long sojourn in black Africa, the other from the northeast.
Affinities verified by place-names, also appear to link the
Berbers and the Iberians of ancient Spain.
The Berbers entered Moroccan history toward the end
of the second millennium B.C. when the neolithic invaders made
contact with the Bafats, dark-skinned Oasis dwellers on the
14
steppe, who were remnants of the earlier savannah people and
possibly the ancestors of the Harratines. Berbers compose
the basic genetic stock of the people of ancient and modern
Morocco; however, as Barbour points out, "no one racial type
can be identified as Berber; the term is simply used con-
veniently for all those peoples who speak a dialect of a
certain language which we call Berber" [Ref. 3]. Classified
as Caucasians of Mediterranean stock (from their Western
European appearance) , the Berbers are a composite people of
anthropologically varied sources, speaking dialects related
to the Hamitic language group. The language has no written
format and even with this apparent handicap to its surviva-
bility is still widely spoken in Morocco and more so in
Algeria where more than a million people use it as their daily
language. In reality, language becomes the only criterion
by which to distinguish them, as the difference of various
Berber tribes appear to be solely linguistic. In Morocco,
Berber is spoken by three distinct groups of tribes each in
a specific portion of the country (Rifians, Middle/Central
Atlas and Anti-Atlas or Sousis Berbers) [Ref. 4].
Berbers, who thus considered themselves the "free
men," have behaved as such since recorded history, and
ironically not only in classical Moroccan history, but in
contemporary as well, Berbers have little conception of
national unity in a political sense. It was not until the
coming of the Arabs in the seventh century and its resulting
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intertwining of separate races with distinct idealogies, that
the basis of a unified political force, resulting in the
monarchial type rule that exists in Morocco today was laid.
Historically a defiant breed however, pure Berbers in the
outlining areas of contemporary Morocco still rely on the
system of government that was utilized by their ancestors
since recorded time. It is not until the input of Arab insti-
tutions into the traditional political system of government,
primarily the rule by Sheiks, drawing their right to rule
from Islam, did dynastic rule emerge.
Prior to this occurrence, however, the basic unity of
social and political organization among the Berbers was the
extended family, usually identified with a particular village
of the sedentary or the traditional grazing grounds of the
nomadic Berbers. Families in turn were bound together in the
clan; and an alliance of clans often tracing their origins
to a common ancestor, formed a tribe. Courts and represen-
tative assemblies guided by customs peculair to the group
functioned at each level of organization. Berber folk law
and government, like Berber religion were highly personalized
and therefore most effective at the lowest levels of their
application. Ultimately each household or tent was its own
republic
.
For mutual defense kindred tribes joined in confedera-
tions, which, because war was a permanent feature of tribal
life, were in time somewhat institutionalized. Some Chieftans
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who were successful in battle established rudimentary terri-
torial states by imposing their rule on defeated tribes and
allies alike; but their kingdoms were easily fragmented, and
the dynasties that they sought to found rarely survived a
generation [Ref. 5]. By the second century B.C., however,
several large although loosely administered Berber kingdoms
had emerged each with a 'monarch* supported by the farmers
of the plains who looked to these kings to protect them from
the raids of the pastoralists of the plateau and the moun-
tains. The Berber kings of Mauritania and neighboring Numidia
ruled in the shadow of Rome and Carthage, often as satellites,
hiring out troops and forming alliances with one or another
of the great powers contending for domination of the western
Mediterranean. After the fall of Carthage in 14 6 B.C., Berber
kings threw in their lots with factions vying for power in
the Roman civil wars of the first century B.C.
These frequent 'alliances' were to occur again and
again over proceeding centuries in which countless waves of
invaders came and went in Morocco. Through the centuries
the Berbers have been subjected to eight principal foriegn
influences: the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals,
Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, and French have all arrived and then
departed; each leaving some trace of its past presence on
Berber society. As a means of adjustment and survival to
these unwanted intrusions, Berber kings throughout history
have allied themselves in one way or another to their
17
uninvited guests. King Hassan II, today, is no exception to
this.
Under the Romans, the pre-dynastic political system
in Morocco consisted of a series of alliances between various
Berber Kingdoms, and the Romans. Rome divided Morocco (which
at that time included present day Mauritania) at the Moulouya
River (near Morocco's present-day border with Algeria) into
two provinces, Mauitania Caesariensis to the east (in present-
day Algeria) and Mauritania Tingitana to the west with its
capitol at Tingis (Tangier) . But because the Berbers, whose
fierce independence kept them from being subjugated (though
the Romans had conquered them) , were uncontrollable through
direct domination, Rome continued to control this vast, ill-
defined territory through alliance with the tribes rather than
through military occupation. Autonomous client Chieftans
policed the frontier and kept the wilder mountain tribes from
the towns and farms. Rome expanded its authority only to
those areas that were economically useful or that could be
defended without additional manpower. Hence Roman adminis-
tration never really applied outside the restricted areas of
the coastal plain and valleys.
The influence of Roman civilization, like Roman politi-
cal control, was restricted to the towns and neighboring
countryside, and it did not filter down beyond a small
Romanized urban elite. Cities were few but each shared the
amenities of urban life characteristic of their Roman intruders
These were the forum, town council, and baths. The baths
still exist as an integral part of Moroccan urban society.
The 'mehari,' or riding camel, was first introduced to
Morocco late in the Roman period and they revolutionalized
transportation and made possible the trip across the desert
for Sudanese gold. The adoption of the camel also gave
devastating mobility to the marauding Berber tribes that had
been driven beyond the Roman frontier into the desert.
Christianity was introduced also during Roman rule in
the second century and gained converts in the towns and among
slaves and Berber farmers. By the end of the fourth century,
the Romanized areas had been Christianized and Christianity
was officially recognized. However, Christianity flourished
in relatively few large centers and after the influx of
Islamic Moslems in the seventh century never really recovered
as a dominant institution in Morocco. Today only eight per-
cent of the population professes the Christian faith, while
ninety percent follow Islam, and a mere two percent are Jew.
After the Romans, a quick succession of would-be
conquerors and rulers entered the confines of Morocco's
borders. The Baltic Vandals, who followed Rome into Morocco,
had relatively little influence on the established political
systems that the Romans had founded in Morocco and none on
the traditional tribal system. In 533 the Byzantine General
Belosarius began the reconquest of Morocco and North Africa
for the Roman Empire aided by some Berber tribes, but in
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Western Morocco effective Byzantine control was limited to a
few heavily fortified outposts. The Berbers there had never
really relinquished their autonomy and resisted any reassirci-
lation attempts into the imperial system.
The fifth to seventh centuries witnessed the pro-
gressive deurbanization of Morocco where the Roman imprint
was rapidly effaced. The social solidarity (a term coined
by Durkein, but much earlier by Ibn Khaldun's 'Asabiyah')/
of the settled areas broke down with the departure of Roman
authority. No coherent form of political organization took
its place as tribal principalities once again rose, were
subdivided, and fell; reaffirming the cycle that began before
the coming of the Romans and continued afterwards.
Ibn Khaldun, the first philosopher of history and the
last intellectual giant of Islam, prophetically portrayed
this cycle of cultural political evolution in his monumental
work, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History , Princeton,
1974. Khaldun believed history repeated itself in cycles and
that these cycles were observable. He felt that the natural
result of the human species interaction was the emergence of
a leader figure. "Human civilization requires political
leadership for its organization. . .politics requires that only
one person exercise control" [Ref. 6]. The cycle of political
rule began with an 'acceptance 1 period, where the rule estab-
lished his support base, then led to succeeding phases of
growth, complacency, corruption, and finally dissolvement
.
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This cycle, according to Khaldun took approximately 120 years
to begin and end. After one cycle ended, another began. It
can now be seen that the accuracy of Khaldun 's assumption in
regards to the cyclical rise and fall of dynasties in North
Africa were absolutely astonishing.
By the beginning of the seventh century, pre-dynastic
rule in Morocco was basically the same as it had always been,
scattered confederations of tribes, each fiercely independent
and subservient to no one. What was about to take place
however, would have the most severe and lasting impact on
traditional Berber society and its system of government; the
coming of the Arabs and Islam. While the extremely important
institution of Islam will be discussed in more detail later,
it is important here to trace its early origins and initial
effect on the Berbers system of pre-dynastic rule.
When the Prophet Mohammed died in A.D. 632, he and
his followers had brought most of the tribes and towns of the
Arabian Peninsula under the banner of the new monotheistic
religion of Islam (Arabic for 'submission'). Islam was con-
ceived of as uniting the individual believer, the state, and
the society under the omnipotent will of God. Islamic rulers
therefore exercised both temporal as well as religious authority
Adherents of Islam, called Muslims (those who submit to the
will of God) , collectively formed the House of Islam (Dar al
Islam) . All others were considered infidels who lay outside
the house awaiting the opportunity to be converted.
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By the mid-7th century, Arab armies had carried Islam
north and east from Arabia in the wake of their rapid con-
quests and westward across North Africa as far as Tripoli.
There, stubborn Berber resistance and their own restraint had
for a time deterred the Arabs from advancing farther west
toward present-day Morocco. The first Arab raid into Morocco
was led by Akbar ben Nafi through the Taza Gap to the coastal
plains in 683, but Arab efforts at political control and
missionary activity did not commence until 710 when an Arab
army under Musa ibn Nusayr, the governor of Ifriquiya (present-
day Tunisia) , invaded Morocco and set about converting the
plains Berbers to Islam. These new converts formed the bulk
of the forces taken by Tariq ibn Tiyad, the Berber governor
of Tangier, to Spain in 711 to intervene in a Visigoth feud.
Tariq returned to Morocco, but the next year Musa led the best
of his Arab troops to Spain and in three years had subdued
all but the mountainous regions in the extreme north. Berbers
were settled strategically throughout Muslim Spain, called
Andalusia, which like Morocco was organized under the politi-
cal and religious leadership of the Umayyad caliph of
Damascus [Ref. 7].
Pre-dynastic Arab rule in Morocco as elsewhere in the
Islamic world in the eighth century had as its chief goal the
establishment of political and religious unity under a caliph-
ate (the office of the Prophet's successor as supreme earthly
leader of Islam) governed in accord with a legal system
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(sharia) administered by religious judges (cadis) to which
all other considerations, including tribal loyalties, were
subordinated. The sharia was based primarily on the Quaran
and on extra-Quranic 'Sayings of the Prophet' (Hadith) and
derived in part from Arab tribal and market law [Ref. 8].
In practice Arab rule was a tyranny whose severity
was mitigated by its inefficiency. It was easily imposed on
the towns, which grew under Arab patronage, and in the farm-
ing areas. Sedentary Berbers turned to the Arabs, just as
they had centuries before to the Romans, for protection against
their nomadic kinsmen. But the Berbers differed essentially
from the Arabs in their political culture and their communal
and representative institutions contrasted sharply with the
personal and authoritarian government that the Arab conquerors
had adopted under Byzantine influence. Even after their con-
version to Islam, Berber tribes retained the customary laws
in preference to the sharia. While the Arabs abhored the
Berbers as barbarians, the Berbers often saw the Arabs only
as an arrogant and brutal military dictatorship bent on col-
lecting taxes; contrary to the tenants of the Quran, which
prescribed preferential treatment of all Muslims [Ref. 9].
Arab rulers continued to levy heavy taxes on Berber converts
under their control. Berber women were prized in Arab harems,
and whole areas might be evacuated to escape the slave traders
[Ref. 10]
.
The Arabs formed an urban elite in Morocco, but they
had come as conquerors and missionaries, not as colonists.
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Their armies had traveled without women and, after occupying
Morocco, they married among the sedentary Berbers, trans-
mitting Arab culture to the townspeople and farmers. These
Berbers quickly became Muslims, but conversion was also rapid
even among the tribes of the hinterland that stoutly resisted
Arab political domination. Through actual integration with
the Berbers as opposed to the almost clinical manner in which
Christianity was introduced during Roman domination centuries
before, Islam was able to endure. However, many Berbers were
opportunists rather than sincere Muslims, and several tribes
that accepted Islam under Arab pressure abandoned it once the
Arab troops, tax collectors, and slave traders had moved on.
The toughest resistance to Islamization came from the desert
tribes; and although Christianity had virtually disappeared
from the settled areas of Morocco within fifty years of the
Arab conquest, paganism and Judaism persisted among the nomads
[Ref . 11] .
Once established as Muslims, the Berbers with their
characteristic love of independence and impassioned religious
temperament, shaped Islam in their own image. They embraced
schismatic Muslim sects—often traditional folk religion
barely disguised as Islam—as a way of breaking from Arab
control with the same enthusiasm that their Christian fore-
bearers had accepted Donatism in opposition to Rome.
As Islam was struggling to make its way in North Africa
and Morocco in the seventh century, a conflict had already
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developed between supporters of rival claimants to the caliph-
ate that would split Islam into two branches— the Orthodox
Sunni and the Shia (literally, party) —which continued
thereafter as the basic division among Muslims. The Shia
supported the claim of the direct descendents of Ali, son-
in-law of Mohammed and the fourth Caliph, whereas the Sunni
favored that of Ali's rival Muawuja, leader of a collateral
branch of Mohammed's tribe, the Quaraysh of Mecca, and the
principle of election of the fittest from the ranks of the
shurfa (tribal elites) . In addition, the Sunni accepted
literal interpretations of the Quran and Hadith and adhered
to the sunna (customs of the Prophet accepted by a consensus
within the Muslim community, hence Sunni) . The Shia, besides
insisting that the caliphate pass in a direct line from
Mohammad, refused to acknowledge the sunna. For them the
Quran was not a closed body of revelation but was open to
further elaboration by inspired imams, and a power that the
Sunni denied even to the caliph. The Shia had their greatest
appeal among non-Arab Muslims, who were scorned like the
Berbers by the desert Arabs [Ref. 12].
The greatest challenge to the Arabs and Islams came
during the Kharidjite movement, of distinctly Berber origin,
which surfaced in a revolt against the Arabs led by Maysara,
a water bearer from Tangier in 735. Although they had affini-
ties with the Shia, the Berber Kharidjites (seceders; liter-
ally, those who emerge from impropriety) proclaimed in
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opposition both to them and the Sunni that any suitable
Muslim candidate could be elected caliph without regard to
his race, station, or descent from the Prophet [Ref. 13].
They also deviated from the mainstream of Islamic theology
by rejecting the idea of justification of faith. Taking a
position directly- paralleling that of the Berber Christian
Donatists, the Kharidjites maintained that a sinner could no
longer be a believer since faith was not possible without
purity.
The attack on the Arab monopoly of the religious
leadership of Islam was explicit in Kharidjite teaching; and,
during a period of dynastic upheaval in the Arab world,
Berbers across the Maghrib rose in revolt in the name of
religion against the restraints of foreign domination. A
number of small Berber kingdoms were established by Kharidjite
sectarians, but they were unable to sustain their fragile
tribal states, so once again, the Berbers now wihtout foreign-
ers to fight, fell to fighting among themselves. Although
the religious heresy was eventually suppressed, the Arab
caliphate was unable to restore its temporal authority in
Morocco
.
At this point in the study it is important to refocus
on the original purpose of Part One, and that is the essence
of the monarchial tradition in Morocco. Up until the coming
of the Arabs, pre-dynastic centralic rule in Morocco was non-
existent. Contracts between countless waves of invaders and
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Berber tribal chieftans was the norm. There was no central
rule. As one group of invaders penetrated the interior and
stayed for different periods of time, but none permanent,
another group followed in its footsteps. Only minimal subju-
gation of the Berber race was achieved.
With the arrival of the Arabs in the seventh century,
however, this situation changed, but not immediately, and by
no means completely. While the past narrative may appear to
be rather drawn out in regards to the effects of Islam on
pre-dynastic rule and the formulation of a monarchial state,
it is in reality only a surface skim at best and many more
details need to be examined as a means to understanding the
far-reaching effects of this religion. However, that endeavor
will have to be undertaken in other studies that allow more
space than the confines of this intentionally narrow overview.
A discussion of one other group of personalities, then,
the Idrisids, will close out this portion of the paper per-
taining to pre-dynastic rule in Morocco.
The continuing struggle for the caliphate had other
important consequences for Morocco. In 750 the Umayyad
caliphs of Damascus were overthrown by the Abbasids, who
moved the caliphate to Baghdad. A surviving Umayyad prince
fled to Morocco and thence, with Berber support, to Spain,
where as Abdel Rahman I, he founded a politically independent
emirate with its capital at Cordova; later known as the
Analusian dynasty which lasted for 250 years.
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In 786 a rebellion by the descendents of Ali in Arabia
against the Abbasids occurred. Many of the followers of
Ali (Alids) were massacred and others fled to the west. Among
these was Mulay Idris ibn Abdallah , who after settling in
among the Awraba--con jectured to have been a Romanized Berber
tribe recently converted to Islam by the Kharidj ites--became
their chieftan primarily because of his descendency to the
prophet and partly because of his learning and piety. From this
base, Idris brought together under his rule a confederation
of western Berber tribes that became the nucleus of the first
Moroccan state. Idris died in 792, poisoned by agents of
Harum al Rashid, an Abbasidian, but left behind a Berber
concubine pregnant with his successor, Mulay Idris II (792-
828) .
Idris II founded two adjacent cities--one Arab, the
other Berger at Fes (Fez) Volubilis in the Taza Gap, which
later symbolically served as the uniting of the Berber and
Arab peoples under an Idrisid king. Fez later became the
educational center in Morocco with the establishment of
Al-Quarawiyyan University in 859.
The Idrisids established in Morocco the ideal of
sharifian rule, the tradition that descent from the prophet
was qualification for political power. But Idris II followed
the Berber tradition of parcelling out his kingdom among
his sons, destroying the Idrisids' s immediate political
achievement of uniting Morocco under a single ruler.
28
Morocco returned then to what it had always been, a
country divided into small communities under local rule. The
Arab influence was the most evident of any conqueror to come
before and today it still is. However, prior to the rise of
the Berber Dynasties which will be the focus of the next
section of Part One, the Arabs only laid the seeds for a
centralized monarchial type political rule in Morocco. They
came a long way from establishing it.
At this point in history the Berbers had no concept
in reality of nationhood. Barbour puts it nicely when he
writes
,
One remarkable fact about them (Berbers) is that the
possession of a common language and of a common resi-
dence in a given area for over two thousand years
appears never to have given them any conception of
national unity in a political sense. [Ref. 14
J
Collectively the Berbers referred to themselves as Imazighan
and by their allowance nothing was going to change this.
Feuding between tribes resumed when outside Arab intervention
declined. Again, the point is made here that when the Berbers
did not have an outside enemy to satisfy their inherent
hostile nature they brought hostility upon each other. Subse-
quently, three great confederations came into being to which
most tribes had ties. The Masmonda were quiet farmers from
the Atlantic coastal plains or the high plains of the Atlas.
The Sanhaja incorporated the fiercely brave, camel-riding
nomads of the steppe and desert. Their traditional enemy
became the third confederation, the Zenata, a tough resource-
ful horsemen from the cold plateau of the northern interior.
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In conclusion, the aspects of pre-dynastic rule in
Morocco have many unclarities, but one dominant theme stands
out; the individualistic nature of the Moroccan native. The
irony of the situation is that from the time of the Phoenician's,
some two thousand years previous, to the arrival of the Arabs
in the seventh century, a country so divided in political
beliefs among the natives, due to their individualistic ideals,
could withstand these intrusions and remain a relatively
autonomous society, existing in the confines of a definable
state. No other country in the world has faced the challenges
to its survival as successfully as that of Morocco.
In the next section of this portion of the paper, the
rise of dynastic rule and subsequent birth of the monarchial
system will be discussed, with primary emphasis given to the
Alawite dynasty which has ruled Morocco since 1666 and is the
family of the current monarch, King Hassan II.
2 . The Rise of Dynasties and the Monarchy
With the exception of the Idrisids in the eighth
through tenth centuries (and even their influence was limited)
,
Morocco continued as it had for centuries; a country divided
into kingdoms of tribal confederations. Berber chieftans
ruled over these elements as autonomously as their larger
counterpart, the monarch, today rules. Slowly however, as
situations necessitated a more united state, Morocco moved
closer and closer to a country with one dominant political
force. The purpose then, of this section, is to continue
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the examination of the evolution of Monarchial rule in Morocco
by focusing on the rise of family dynasties; those groups that
maintained their positions for several years. No other factor
in Moroccan political history contributed to the institution-
alization of the monarchy as much as families that, over time,
were able to strengthen their political position to the point
where they became the dominant political force in the society.
The head of that family thus reaped the benefits of this
timely struggle and became the monarch.
The necessary factor for the monarch to emerge became
time; time for it to adapt, to become more complex, more
coherent, and finally, autonomous. These four variables,
given to us by Samuel P. Huntington in his epic work, Political
Order in Changing Societies , Yale, 1968, are what Huntington
describes as those most necessary in institution building.
For now it is sufficient to state that the longer a family
was able to exist as a political force, the more powerful its
head became. Equally, early rulers immediately saw the neces-
sity to unit the independent tribes of Morocco. Successful
unity under one leader meant longevity for their family. It
is this struggle for unity and longevity by elite families
that is the focus here.
The eleventh and twelfth centuries witnessed the
founding of great Berber dynasties, led by religious reformers,
that were to dominate the Maghrib for more than 2 00 years. It
is important to note that all political movements in the
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country after the introduction of Islam by the Arabs had
religious rather than secular underpinnings. Islam had
quickly become the single unifying thread among the Berbers
and through Islam, families made their move for power.
The first of these families to seek a dominant politi-
cal entity through Islam were the Almoravids. Early in the
eleventh century Lemtuna Sanbaja Chieftans from northern
Mauritania (now the southern tip of Morocco) returning from
a pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five requirements of those
professing Islam, invited a Moroccan teacher, Ibn Yasin, to
preach to their isolated desert tribes. Under his direction
a strict religious brotherhood was founded at a fortified
retreat (ribat)
,
placed by early sources on an island off
the coast on the Niger and Senegal Rivers. Initiates in the
brotherhood were called "the men of the ribat" (al murabitun,
transliterated as Almoravid) . Modern historians have dis-
counted the existence of a single stronghold of these "warrior
monks" {Ref. 15], but by the middle of the century the
Sanhajas had gathered in the western Sahara under the Almoravid
banner to sweep into Morocco and reform Islam by force of
arms.
The Sanhajas controlled a triangular piece of the
Sahara that stretched from the Sous in the north to sourthern
Mauritania in the west and Timbuktu in the east. They were
"men of the veil"--protected from the elements and the evil
eye by the cloth they wrapped around their faces in the
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fashion still followed by the Tuaregs--who despised unveiled
Berbers as "fly eaters" [Ref. 16]. Although the religious
intent of the Almoravids is clear, their Islam crusade was
also motivated by their desire to break the power of the
Zenatos, who competed with them for control of the trade
routes. They moved into Morocco through the Tafilalt region
and in 1062 founded the city of Marrakech, which would be
the capital of the dynasty established by their leader, Ibn
Tashfin (d. 1103) . Sweeping northward toward the Mediterranean,
the Almoravids attacked the Umayyads, Fatimids, Kharidjites,
and Zenatas and forcibly converted pagan tribes along the
way. By 10 8 2 they had conquered the whole of the Maghrib
as far east as present-day Algiers, and by the end of the
century they had built an empire that reached from Ghana to
the Ebro River in Spain.
The Almoravid sultans brought nominal political unity
to all of present-day Morocco and left their successors with
territorial claims in the western Sahara. This continues
to be one of the major political disputes in the country
today. They also imposed the conservative Sunni Malahite
rite that endured as the official form of Islam in Morocco.
During their time however, the Almoravids, could conceive
of no structure of government beyond that of the tribal
confederation. Dominion over Morocco depended on continued
Sanhaja allegiance and their dominance over the other con-
federations. Islam remained the single thread holding things
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together. While the Sanhajas were "Islamized," they were
never "Arabized" [Ref. 17]. The Zenata were never totally
subdued and a basic division between the bilad al makhzan
(government territory) and bilad al siba (so-called dissident
territory was formed) . The essential difference between the
two was that the former recognized the political authority of
the sultan and paid taxes while the latter did not. The
government functioning in the bilad al makhzan was autocratic
and hierarchial. Life in the bilad al siba was communal and
egalitarian, and it was usually organized at no higher level
than that of the tribe. These dissident tribes, always on
the defensive might venerate the sultan as Imam but stead-
fastly oppose the expansion of the makhzan in their territory.
Under the Almoravids, Morocco as well as Spain,
acknowledged the spirtual authroity of the Abbasid caliphate
in Baghdad, reuniting them temporarily with the Islam in
the Middle East. Disturbed by the lassitude that they found
in Spain, the Almoravids attempted to stimulate a religious
revival there based on their own brand of Islam; but their
leaders, who had established themselves comfortably at Seville,
soon conformed to the tolerant attitudes of Andalusian life-
style. This led to their attributed corruption and lost the
Almoravids the respect of the Sanhaja Chieftans, thereby
dissipating the military power on which their authority
rested, and eventually led to the downfall of the first
great Berber dynasty.
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The second great Berber dynasty was that of the
Almohads which began with the discontent of the peoples of
the anti-Atlas (Masmondas) for Almoravid rule. A new religious
reform movement whose followers, known as Unitarians (al
muahhid; literally, one who claims the oneness of God,
transliterated as Almohad) , sprang up and preached a doctrine
of moral regeneration through reaffirmation of monotheism.
The founder of the Almohad movement was a member of
the Sunni ulama, Ibn Tumart (d. 133) , who returned from his
pilgrimage to Mecca to denounce the Almoravids for their
decadence. Recognized as al Mahdi— a "sinless one" sent from
God to redeem his people—by his followers in 1121, Ibn Tumart
condemned the humanistic rather than spiritual beliefs found
in Berber folk religion and was allowed to continue unchecked
by the sultan.
As judge and political leader as well as spiritual
director, Ibn Tumart gave the Masmonda Almohads, the formal
governmental structure that the Sanhaja Almoravids had lacked.
It was based on a hierarchial and theoretic centralized
government, but one that recognized Berber traditions of
representative government and provided for a consultative
assembly composed of tribal leaders, which is not dissimilar
to the policy of the current monarch. Ibn Tumart tried
unsuccessfully to bridge the gap that divided the tribes.
Before his death he handpicked as his successor, Abdel Mum.in
(reigned 1130-63) , a Zenata. Abdel Mumin assumed the title
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Commander of the Faithful, which would thereafter remain the
property of Morocco's monarchs
.
By 1140 the Almohad monarch occupied most of Morocco
and in 114 6 he took Marrakech , massacred its inhabitants,
and put an end to the Almoravid dynasty. But Marrakech re-
mained as the capital of the new Berber dynasty, which under
Sultan Yacub Al Mansur, the new monarch (reigned 1184-90)
,
stretched from Tripoli to Spain and achieved its zenith under
Sultan Mohammed al Nasir (reigned 1199-1214) .
Almohad rule was characterized initially by theology
but gave way gradually to dynastic politics. Blood ties re-
placed moral qualities as a qualification for high office
in the makhzan. Already by 1156 a distinction was made be-
tween leaders drawn from the sultan's family and the Almohad
tribal leaders; and, as its empire grew, the dynasty became
more removed from the Berber support that had launched it.
The Almohads shifted their power base to Granada,
Spain and after the epic battle of Las Navos de Tolosa (1212)
,
a watershed in the history of the Reconquest where Muslim
strength ebbed thereafter, their demise rapidly occurred.
Andalusia was reduced to the emirate of Granada, which had
bought its safety by betraying the Almohads' Spanish Capital.
The Hafsids wanted control of Ifriquiya from the empire, and
the Almohad position in Morocco was compromised by factional
strife and a renewal of tribal warfare.
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But the monarchial institution was growing. The
Almoravid sultans had shown the advantages of political unity
and now, the Almohads had given Morocco its first formal
governmental structure recognizing Berber tradition, all
under a single ruler who served as judge, political, and
spiritual leader. Rapid growth in the institution of the
monarchy continued from this point as one political dynasty
followed another.
The last great Berber dynasty to rule Morocco was the
Beni Merin (Merinids) , a partially Arabized Zenata tribe of
pastoralists of the high plains who had remained the enemies
of the Masmonda even after the Zenata confederation submitted
to the Almohads. They rose to power in 1212— the same year
as the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa—when they defeated an
Almohad army sent to subdue them and initiated nearly sixty
years of warfare of Marrakech, the last Almohad bastion in
1271. The new Merinid dynasty established its capital at
Rabat, the site of an Almohad fortress.
The Merinids 1 contribution to the institutionalization
of the monarchy was limited. They presided over Morocco
during a period of steady political and economic decline and
despite the best efforts of Abu al Hassan (reigned 1331-51)
,
the Merinids were unable to restore the frontiers of the
Almohads 1 Maghribi empire. Primarily because they did not
base their power on a program of religious reform as their
predecessors had done. Of necessity they compromised with
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the folk cults, which had survived the intrusion of Almoravid
and Almohad orthodoxy. Islam had little appeal outside the
mosques and schools of the cities. In the countryside, the
members of the Ulama were replaced by wandering holy men
called Marabouts, who were mystics and seers; miracle workers
endowed with baraba ('gift of grace'), whose tradition ante-
dated Islam and was as old as religion itself among the
Berbers. Moroccan Islam thus took shape as a coexisting blend
of the scrupulous intellectualism of the Ulama and the some-
times frenzied emotionalism of the masses.
By the middle of the fifteenth century the Merinids
had spent their strength. In 1465 the last of them were
ritually slaughtered by a mob of religious fanatics in Fes,
leaving a Wattasid as heir to what was left of the bilad al
makhzan (since 14 20 actual political power had been in the
hands of grand viziers drawn from the Beni Wattas, a related
Zenata tribe) . Wattasids ruled Morocco for more than a
century as sultans without really controlling it.
In concluding this narrative on the rise of Berber
dynasties and their influence on the institutionalization of
the monarchy, certain facts stand out. The Berber dynasties
gave native Moroccans some measure of collective identity and
political unity under a native regime for the first time in
their history, and they created the idea of an imperial
maghrib under Berber control that survived in some form from
dynasty to dynasty. They revived Islam and defeated
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Kharidjitism and repulsed Shiism, assuring the victory in
Morocco of Sunni Malihite orthoxosy as the official Islam.
The Berber dynasties did so, however, without affecting the
popular Islam--the folk religion—of the countryside.
Finally the Berber dynasties brought the brilliant urban
civilization of the Andalusians to Morocco.
The Berber dynasties failed because succeeding ruling
castes were established that soon isolated themselves from
their supporters. In each case a breach opened between the
military and the political administration, with the tribes
aliented from both. None of the dynasties managed to create
an integrated society out of a group dominated by tribes
jealous of their autonomy and individual identity. Dynasties
were simply expressions of triumphant Berber tribalism. They
were Sanhajas (Almoravid) , Massmondas (Almohads) , or Zenatas
(Merinids) , first, Moroccan second. When tribal support
failed or when supporting tribes lost their warlike spirit,
the dynasty fell. To a great extent tribalism, rather than
foreign intervention, frustrated the amalgamation of Berber
Morocco.
During the long period of turmoil that accompanied
the steady decay of the last Berber dynasties the seeds were
planted that would see the rise of the final group of dynas-
ties to rule Morocco; the Sharifian. It is within the frame-
work of the ideologies and political practices of the two
families that represented Sharifian rule, the Saads and the
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Alawis, that monarchial rule in Morocco reached the point at
which it exists today.
The 'shurfa' were those families or tribes claiming
direct descent from the Prophet, and their lineage was usually
acknowledged by an edict (dahir) from the sultan. Older Arab
families, the Idrisids among them and even some Berber Class
laid claim to the title, but at the beginning of the six-
teenth century, the shurfa were particularly identified with
the Arab tribes that had settled in southern Morocco in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They constituted a religious
aristocracy, respected throughout Morocco, for the baraka
they had inherited as Mohammed's children, and were sought out
to act as mediators in tribal disputes. Their prestige was
greatest in the bilad al siba where they exercised a stabi-
lizing influence in the absence of any authority above the
tribal level. It was the shurfa who took the lead in a
popular reaction to the European penetration of Morocco by
the Portuguese in 1511.
In that year, the marabouts of the Sous proclaimed
mulay Ahmed as shaykh (tribal leader) of the sharifian Saadi
tribe, as a mahdi to lead a jihad (holy war) against the
Portuguese. Initially unsuccessful, Ahmed and his successors
turned on the Beni Wattas and led the southern Arab tribes
against the imperial city of Marrakech, where they set up a
rival government. The capture of Fes by the people of the
Sous (Saads) , later in 1559 marked the downfall of the last
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Berber dynasty and the establishment of sharifian control
over the entire bilad al makhzan [Ref. 18].
The Saad dynasty was marked, however, with much
internal strife and bloodshed among its members, each
attempting to rest control over the other. The most notable
of this dynasty was Ahmed al Mansur (reigned 1578-160 3) , a
contemporary of Elizabeth I of England. His contribution
to a united Morocco and a monarch as its head was signifi-
cant. His military prowess and wealth earned him respect in
the royal courts of Europe and his capacity for cruelty
engendered awe and obedience in his subjects, loyalty in his
servants, and restraint in potential rivals. He tamed dissi-
dent tribes, curbed the influence of the marabouts, and halted
the westward advance of the Ottoman Turks into territory
claimed by Morocco.
Al Mansur, who surrounded himself with skilled
bureaucrats, gave new life to the forms of government developed
under the Berber dynasties. He also added elements borrowed
from Ottoman practice, particularly in the introduction of
pashas to govern newly acquired provinces distant from the
mahkzan. His caids, adequately backed by jaysh (warlike)
troops, became effective tax collectors among the growing
number of tribes that submitted to his authority.
The Saad dynasty lasted about one hundred years.
Eight of the twelve Saadi monarchs died by assassination.
After al Mansur' s death—by natural causes—disputed
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successions again divided the country. Although the Saads
retained title to the sultanate until 1659, their writ even-
tually extended no further than the area around Marrakech.
Tribes withdrew their allegiance to the makhzan and the
marabout republics suppressed by al Mansur, reasserted their
autonomy.
During the relatively short tenure of the Saad dynasty
important contributions to the establishment of a united
Morocco and of a central monarchy were made. With Islam as
its guide and more importantly, its authorization, the estab-
lishment of sharafian rule in Morocco had been achieved for
all time. While it met its demise like so many other ruler-
ships that went before, through internal strife, the station
of the monarch itself continued to grow. The spread of the
Arabs and Islam by this time was significant, not only in the
urban areas, but many of the tribes, heretofore pure Berber
stock, now included Arabs all espousing the preaching of the
prophet. One of these preachings was the obligation of all
true Muslims to accept the existence of God's representative
on Earth, the sultan.
The final dynasty to be established in Morocco was
the Alawites. This dynasty has for the exception of the
exile of Mohammed V in 1953-1955, been continuous since 1666.
It is during the time of the Alawites that the monarchy was




There have been seventeen Alawis sultans ("Kings,"
after 19 57 when Mohammad V proclaimed such) that have ruled
in succession since the first, Mulay Rashid, established
himself as monarch in 1666. This study by no means can trace
the history of each leader up to and include the current
monarch, King Hassan II. What it will do, however, is look
at the most important ones and attempt to determine signifi-
cant contributions made by them to the permanent establishment
of monarchial rule in the country.
Amid the chaos that characterized the decline of the
Saad dynasty another sharifian Arab tribe, the Alawis (or
Filalis) gained a commanding position in the oasis of the
Tafilalt region (Western Sahara, east of Marrakech) to which
they had migrated from the Yemen in the Merinid times. They
expanded their influence across Morocco at the expense of the
marabout republics which had reemerged during the same period,
attacking them in the name of Islam. Mulay Rashid emerged
from competition with several of his kinsmen as leaders of
the Alawite movement, and in 1666 he was proclaimed sultan
at Fes after driving out its marabout rulers.
It was Rashind's brother and successor, Mulay Ismail
(1672-1727) , however, that made the earliest significant
contribution to the permanent establishment of the monarchy.
He spent the first twenty years of his long reign consoli-
dating his hold on the makhzan and winning the recognition
of dissident tribes. He renewed the holy war against a
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weakened Spain, reducing its holdings in Morocco to a few
modest enclaves along the coast, reoccupied Tangier when it
was abandoned by the English in 1684, and took the offensive
against the Ottoman Turks in Algiers.
To accomplish all of this, Ismail built a professional
army estimated to have numbered 150,000 troops. Rif Berbers
and European and Turkish mercenaries supplemented units from
the jaysh tribes, but more than half of Ismail's army was
composed of slave troops (abid) imported from the western
Sudan. As Barbour further explains,
Black boys and girls were carefully brought up, the
boys being trained in military pursuits and the girls
in domestic arts, and later married. [Ref. 19]
From them a corps of black preatorians, the Bukhariyin, was
picked to serve as the sultan's personal guard. When not in-
volved in war, the abid were employed in constructing the
many casbahs (fortresses) from which they maintained peace
in the countryside.
Ismail sent envoys to Louis XIV of France, whose court
he admired, and sought to be recognized on an equal footing
with his rival, the Ottoman Sultan of Constantinople. Embas-
sies were exchanged with other European powers as well, but
Morocco, traditionally viewed with suspicion in Europe, failed
to win their acceptance as a partner in the community of
nations
.
Ismail made his capital at Meknes. There he erected
palaces in emulation of Versailles and mosques, threw up a
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line of fortifications that were the most awesome in North
Africa, and dug deep dungeons for his enemies, using the
labor of convicts and prisoners of war. Ismail was an arche-
typal ruler, but he extended the bilad a makhzan as no other
before him had. "Your King Louis commands men while I command
brutes," Ismail is supposed to have told the French ambassador,
justifying the ruthless nature of his rule; and indeed the
edifice of state, which Ismail labored to construct during
his fifty-five year reign, crumbled at his death as a result
of thirty years of anarchy caused by the competition between
his sons [Ref . 20]
.
This state of anarchy was caused in part by the fact
that primogeniture had never taken root in Morocco, and the
laws of succession remained vague. In theory it would be
determined that one of the shurfa, usually a brother or
favorite son of the sultan, had succeeded to his baraka and
was singled out to follow him to the throne. A proclamation
by the ulama would confirm the selection. This was monarchy
by consensus. But in practice there was no fundamental
principle to guide the ulama in determining who among the
royal family had been bestowed with the charisma that enabled
him to rule, except the ability of a candidate to enforce his
claim to it and exclude his rivals. Interestingly, the same
situation existed 250 years later at the beginning of King
Hassan II' s monarchial takeover. This will be discussed in
greater detail in the next section of the study.
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Civil War raged for thirty years after Ismail's
death until his grandson, Sidi Mohammad III (reigned 1757-90),
succeeded in ending conflict within the dynasty and gained
acceptance by the tribes in a much diminished bilad al
makhzan. Unlike his grandfather, a pious and patient sultan,
Mohammed enforced his authority when he could afford to, but
contented himself within nominal sovereignty and recognition
of his religious leadership in those areas where he could not.
The military establishment, less reliable than before, was
reduced to the minimum required to defend the cities but
more importantly eliminate a potential rival to his throne.
Because of Mohammed's efforts' to reform official
Islam, Morocco stagnated culturally in the eighteenth century.
The arts were discouraged and intellectual inquiry in the
schools was stifled by a sultan whose religious fundamentalism
expressed itself in book burning.
To help cure Morocco's ailing social, economic, and
political culture, France received a most-favored-nation
status in 1767 in return for economic aid and unfortunately
for Moroccans, by the end of the eighteenth century largely
controlled Morocco's economy. This was the beginning of the
yoke that it would take nearly two hundred years for the
monarchy to break.
Also during Mohammed's reign, a treaty of (later)
great significance was signed with a country that one day
would insure Morocco's continuance as an independent state,
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but more importantly, the institution of the monarch itself.
This was the Treaty of Marrakech , signed in 1787 between the
newly independent United States and Morocco. Morocco was
among the first nations to recognize the independent United
States and the Marrakech treaty remains the longest unbroken
agreement of its kind in American diplomatic -history . It
also settled outstanding difficulties resulting from the
seizure of American ships and seamen by Barbory pirates, the
United States agreeing to pay an annual tribute of $10,000
(U.S.) to assure protection of American interests in Morocco.
Following a suggestion made by George Washington, an American
consulate was opened at Tangier in 1791. The building acquired
as the consul's residence in Tangier is the oldest piece of
United States property abroad.
In 1836 a second treaty, the Treaty of Meknes, was
signed between the two countries which formalized the most-
favored-nation-status conferred on the United States by
Morocco in 1824. It also accorded extraterritorial privileges
to American citizens, granting them capitulatory rights to
be tried only by courts established at United States Consu-
lates in Morocco.
Unlike the French, the United States made no attempt
to exploit their favored position with Morocco. This, as
history has shown, accounts for the closely tied political
relationship that the two countries enjoy today as opposed to
the often strained friendship between the French and Morocco.
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The reign of Alawite sultans following Mohammed
according to Barbour, was "the least interesting 150 years
in Moroccan history" [Ref . 21] . No new monuments were built,
the sultans devoted most of their time to military expedition
around the country as a show of force in order to retain
respect and to collect taxes. It was a period of decadence
in the eyes of European observers, yet Morocco kept its
independence, while other Maghribi states and Egypt were under
French, British, or Turkish domination. Its unique political
order survived, and the Alawite dynasty remained on the
throne. The Sultan enjoyed absolute rights in theory, but
in practice he had only limited means of enforcing them.
The Alawite dynasty had survived longer than any
before it up to this time probably because it had recognized
its limitations and made the necessary adjustments, its
sultans preferring to reign even if they could not always
rule
.
At times, these adjustments took the form of compro-
mise. The sultans deferred authority to their supporters and
the government officials on whom they could depend for pro-
tection, but loyalty had to be purchased. Certain tribal
areas were abandoned altogether to the bilad al siba. Of
greatest significance, however, was the compromise made be-
tween the sultans and the marabouts, between official Islam
and Maraboutism.
It was accepted throughout Morocco that baraka con-
ferred authority. In the bilad al makhzan this authority
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belonged to the sultan by right, and it extended to both
political and religious matters. In the bilad al siba, how-
ever, it conferred only religious matter. Cooperation be-
tween the sultans and the marabouts entailed an essential
compromise: the sultan moderated his claims, and the mara-
bouts used their considerable influence to restrain their
followers from attacking the makhzan. The Alawites also
allowed that baraka was not indivisible in the sultan but was
a multiple gift that came in a special way to many of the
faithful. The marabouts recognized that the shurfa ruled by
divine grace, and the shurfa in turn recognized that the same
grace fell on hundreds of marabouts as well. These compro-
mises established the pattern of communication between the
sultan and the wandering holy men that still exist to this
day.
During the nineteenth century the only strong Alawite
figure to emerge was Sultan Mulay Hassan I (reigned 1873-94).
His government was remarkably stable, and he tried, with some
success to reduce corruption and introduce modern reforms.
Hassan I reorganized and equipped the Moroccan army and led
it in continuous campaigns, subduing dissident tribes and
collecting taxes, in a manner that impressed European
observers
.
Hassan I fell ill and died while on a tax-collecting
expedition and was succeeded by his son, Abdel Aziz (reigned
1894-1908) . During this time, however, he was only a
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figurehead because the real ruler was Bu Ahmed, a chamberlin
for Hassan I that, at the time of Hassan's death, had the
youngest son of Hassan named sultan by the ulama and then
proceeded to imprison Aziz's older brothers. Until his
death in 1900, Bu Ahmed manipulated Aziz and pulled the
strings of government.
From 1900-1908, Aziz attempted to rule the country
but was totally inept. Morocco economically deteriorated
during this time and became virtually mortaged to European
interests
.
In 1906 the murder of a French citizen in Marrakech
was the pretext for the occupation of Oujda by French forces
sent there in 1904 to help patrol the border. Further vio-
lence against the French ensued at Rabat and Casablanca and
by the end of Aziz's reign in 190 8, French presence in
Morocco was significant..
Aziz was followed by his brother Mulay Hafid (reigned
1908-1912), and Hafid's youngest brother, Mulay Usif (reigned
1912-1927) , who was a puppet of the French. During this time
the makhzan had no real powers and the caids and pashas be-
came merely the executive assistants of the French regional
administrators
.
Characteristics of the French Protectorate period will
be examined in more detail in Part Two of this study, but for
the present it is sufficient to state that from 1912 (its
beginning) to 19 56 (its demise) , the French government firmly
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implanted itself and controlled the destiny of the country.
The monarchy became the vehicle for legitimate and, as peace-
ful as possible, French rule. However, like so many times
before, the 'imazighan' temperment of the Berber people,
forced the reestablishment of its own kind as the dominant
political 'force in the country by the middle of the twentieth
century.
Many occurrences in a rapidly changing international
system took the focus off of internal problems to some extent
and helped allow the Alawites to continue their rule. The
position of the monarchy became less and less important as
did that of Berbers as a whole, as two world wars erupted and
other French excursions into Algeria and Indo-China occurred
during the relatively brief period of the protectorate. While
the French kept themselves busy with domination and survival
at the same time. Berbers and Arabs alike in Morocco quietly
united under the only native leadership they had, the monarchy,
and began an authentic Nationalist movement that was to re-
pulse foreign domination of the country once and for all and
firmly establish the institution of monarchial rule. Again,
this will be the primary subject matter of the next part of
the paper.
The last two Alawite monarchs, Mohammed V and his son
Hassan II, will receive special attention during the remainder
of this thesis. It was these two leaders who, more than any
who had come before them, that established the monarchy as
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the most dominant political force in the country today.
Mohammad V was the nucleus of the nationalist movement and
Hassan II, through his inherited traits of manipulation and
ruthless control, has kept not only the Alawite family in
control of the monarchy, but the monarchy itself in a dominant
position.
In conclusion of this discussion on the rise of
dynastic rule in Morocco, certain points need to be reiterated.
Berber dynasties established the idea of a united Moroccan
state but did not achieve it. One Berber family after another
achieved a relatively autonomous position yet was unable to
maintain it. The argument here is that because of the lack
of continuous rule by a single family who could, over time,
establish not only itself but the position of the monarchy
as well, political unity under one leader was never achieved.
Under Sharif ian rule, primarily the Alawites, monarchial
rule in Morocco evolved to the level of institutionalization
it now enjoys. This was accomplished through continuous and
methodical efforts by ruler after ruler to maintain the
existence of his rule and more importantly, that of his family
heir. Concession and compromise coupled with the traditional
right to rule established by Islam insured the solvency of the
monarchy. While not always powerful in practice, it was so
in theory. The 'idea' of a monarch had finally been entrenched
into the Berber mind, a feat never achieved by the Sharifian's
Berber predecessors.
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Up until this point, the analysis of the evolution of
monarchial rule in Morocco has centered upon a chronological
examination of the rise of dynasties in the country for the
purpose of explaining how monarchial rule evolved. While
this is a critical endeavor, in that background explanations
in the form of historical occurrences are necessary to set
the tone for further study, it is by no means all inclusive.
Other important factors must enter into the study as well.
Certain institutions and guiding principles characterize the
essence of traditional monarchial rule besides the rise of
family dynasties. It is a focus on these factors that will
comprise the remainder of this section of the thesis.
B. THE TRADITIONAL MONARCHY— ITS ESSENCE
Aside from the study of the evolution of dynasties in
Morocco as cause for the establishment of monarchial rule,
certain other contributions to what Huntington and many
others have termed "the traditional monarchy," require ex-
planation if a clear picture of how traditional monarchial
rule of Morocco developed.
Huntington describes four forces or institutions that
are usually at work in a traditional monarch. These are
the monarch himself, the Church, the landowning aristocracy,
and the Army [Ref. 22]. While these four institutions have
certainly played a major part in the political activities of
the Moroccan state, a modification to this 'model* is necessary
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before using it as a vehicle to describe the essence of the
traditional monarchy in Morocco.
As sultan, the monarch theoretically 'owns' the lands
that comprise the Moroccan state. In practice, however,
land ownership in Morocco in the pre-1940 era was, as it is
today, piecemeal. There is makhzan (central government)
land, jaysh (army) land, and that land owned by tribes and
clans. Different amounts of land are owned by each of these
elements but the primary ownership of land holdings in Morocco
besides the monarch, belongs to the makhzan. Makhzan land
comprises much of the public domain, most forestland, all
unused land and wasteland and a considerable amount of usable
land. Jaysh and tribal land on the other hand, is of a rela-
tively smaller proportion.
In regard to this explanation, the "landowning aristrocracy
"
variable of Huntington's model will be represented by the
makhzan; the members of the early central government in
Morocco, because they are essentially one and the same.
It is through Huntington's model that the remainder of
this analysis of the essence of traditional monarchial rule
in Morocco will be made. While Huntington's use of the model
is different from that here (his being aimed at the effects
of modernization on the four variables) , it accurately defines
the four basic institutions that characterized the essence
of the traditional monarchy.
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1 . The Monarch
To some degree there has always been a monarch, or
at least the makings of one, in Morocco. Initially, the
'monarch' was the Berber people themselves as they rallied
time and again to repulse countless waves of invaders in the
country. If monarchial rule is seen as Webster states,
"someone or something holding preeminent position or power,"
then the Berber race with its 'imazighan' attitude was the
only major natural political force in the country in the
early years.
The monarchy as a single entity began to slowly appear
through the evolvement of the Berber tribe as families bound
together in clans, which in turn formed tribes that ultimately
joined into confederations. Some chieftans who were success-
ful in battle, established rudimentary territorial states
but their kingdoms were easily fragmented and these 'dynas-
ties' rarely survived a generation.
The coming of the Arabs and Islam however, first
established in Morocco the ideal of a single monarch. This
required the acceptance of Islam and its precepts, often by
force. The forceful leader, usually Arab, drawing upon his
individual charisma (which the Berbers respected) and military
strength, began slowly to establish territorial control over
large areas. The important feature of this movement however,
is that the would-be monarch was allowed to expand his control
because many Berbers, now ingested with Islam, felt he had
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the right to do so. The first of these great ruling families,
the Idrisids, were discussed fully earlier. One of their
important contributions however requires reiteration.
The Idrisids established in Morocco the ideal of
sharifian rule, the tradition that descent from the Prophet
was a qualification for political power. This, in turn,
established the basic guiding principle determining the
representative for all monarchial rule that was to follow
in the country.
It was during the rise of Sharifian dynastic rule,
and primarily the Alawites, that traditional monarchial
characteristics became evident. These were kinship, religion,
and custom on the one hand, and balancing, juggling and
orchestration of quasi-feudal interests on the other.
Because of his kinship in a family that claimed direct
descent from the Prophet (Shurfa) the monarch claimed the
right to rule. By careful appointment of the local ulama
(religious leader of the tribes) the monarch insured this
right would be legitimized and unchallenged. In the case of
all the Alawite sultans up to the present one, this traditional
characteristic remains.
Religiously, the monarch's position was established
in the Quran and became a principle source of the monarch's
power. He was designated as imam, or spiritual leader, and
as the Commander of the Faithful [Ref . 23] . The Hadith
(words of the Prophet) spells it out explicitly,
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Verily the sultan is a shadow of God on Earth. Every
oppressed man out of His servants takes shelter with
him. When he administers justice, there is gratitude
on the part of the subjects. [Ref. 24]
The custom of monarchial rule developed slowly over time but
by the nineteenth century a historical acceptance of the
monarches temporal authority among the Moroccan peoples had
been achieved and included a broad patronage and appointment
powers. As shall be seen in Part Two of this thesis, the
customary privileges of the sultan have manifested themselves
to an unprecedented degree in the current monarch.
All three of the above characteristics were closely
tied to Islam and in fact dependend upon it for their
existence. Speaking contemporarily, but with a voice just as
suitable for the past, Hermassi states that the "Moroccan
monarchy has been the alpha and omega of the entire society;
in the contemporary situation, it has been impossible for
the emerging elites to undertake any political change in the
absence of the primordial context and obliged reference of
the monarchy" [Ref. 25]
.
The traditional characteristics of religious legiti-
macy marked the early monarchs but so did those of balancing,
juggling and orchestration. Each of these characteristics
originated from the earliest Berber chieftan and later mani-
fested itself in the Alawite monarch of the nineteenth
century. As will be seen in Part Two, they have also become
the dominant characteristics of the monarch of present-day
Morocco.
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Early Berber chieftans contracted their tribes out to
various outside invaders in exchange for recognition from
these temporary rulers of the chief's position in the tribe
or confederacy, but more importantly for protection from
rival tribes. Survival of the tribe and the chief as its
leader was the primary goal in all instances. By carefully
balancing his own goals as well as those of the invaders
against the capabilities of each, the Berber chieftan was,
in some cases, able to achieve a relatively secure and some-
what powerful position. Some were better at the game than
others and it was not until the Alawites that evidence of a con-
sistent ability to balance and juggle alliances is found.
Early Alawites, however, who tried aggressive domination
rather than the orchestration of interests of not only the
monarch but the rest of the society as well, realized only
limited success. Sultan Mulay Hassan I (reigned 1783-94),
was the only strong figure to emerge in Morocco in the nine-
teenth century. His government was remarkably stable, and
he was able to, with some success, to reduce corruption and
introduce modern reforms by a careful system of orchestrating
the activities of the elite (to include himself) and of the
Berber people themselves (from whom he realized that his
recognition must come) . Other monarchs that simply attempted
to meet their own needs and achieve their singular ambitions
did not fair well in the survival game. In conclusion, the
Alawite monarch did however, according to Clifford Geertz.
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He was able to "put together what, in most other parts of the
Muslim world, were directly antithetical principles of
political and religious organization: the princippel that
the ruler is ruler because he is supernaturally qualified to
be so; and the principle that the ruler is ruler because the
competent spokesman of the community have collectively agreed
that he is" [Ref . 26] . The careful monarch assured himself
of the latter principle through the appointment of friends
and family to those positions that were recognized as the
competent spokesmen for the communities. This characteris-
tic, again, remains today in the monarchy.
2 . The Church
Huntington's second variable, the Church, has been
discussed adequately and only reiteration of some important
points are appropriate here.
The Church = Islam and Islam = the monarch was the
formula that became appropriate for explaining traditional
monarchial rule in Morocco not only in pre-1940 Morocco but
currently as well.
The individualistic characteristic of the Berber
native naturally refuted religion in the early stages.
Christianity was repulsed along with Judaism. It was not
until the Arabs brought Islam by force and through several
revivals by various monarchs over the years (because they
felt it was the popular thing to do and because more of the
natives followed Islam than did not) did religion become the
59
dominant political force in the country. The monarch, by
reasons discussed previously, became its representative
spokesman
.
Islam established the monarchy as much as the monarchy
helped Islam gain its permanent foothold in the society.
Both forces working together, instituted a team that has not
been beated yet.
Many references to Islam and its influence on the
workings of the monarchy will be made throughout the remainder
of this thesis, but for now it is sufficient to state that
it is the singular thread that holds the entire political
society together. Early on, Islam provided the direction for
Moroccan social and political behavior to take. Today it is
referred to in all aspects of social, political and economic
decisions that the monarchy makes, simply because it is the
only absolutely accepted rationale for these decisions.
3 . The Makhzan
Huntington's third variable, the "landowning aris-
tocracy," as explained previously, was represented in
Moroccan society of the pre-1940 era by the bilad al makhzan
(centralized authority) of whom the monarch was the head.
Similar to the relationship between Islam and the monarch,
so was that of the monarch to the makhzan. In itself it be-
came institutional and still exists today in the society but
to a less important degree, giving away its original signifi-
cant position to that of the monarchy itself.
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The makhzan existed at the root of a fundamental
dichotomy that lay at the center of Moroccan society and
politics: the urban areas under the makhzan versus the dissi-
dent bilad al siba (rural countryside)
.
The diversity of Moroccan society was held together
by what Waterbury called "a stable system of violence" [Ref.
27], or a competitive tension, balanced conflict, type of
situation. Shared interests (basically the desire to preserve
one's socio-politico economic position) generally overrode
pluralistic difference. Both the elites and the masses were
subject to the interaction of competitive animosity and shared
interdependence, and interaction that provided a certain
equilibrium, generally stable at any given time but always
in a state of flux.
Morocco's government in the nineteenth century was
little different in form from what the country had known
previously. The monarch himself was a recognized entity but
his power base, the makhzan, was not. The influence of the
makhzan over the tribes varied in relation to the strength of
its army and the forces that any given tribe might assemble
against it. To finance his government, the monarch had to
each year call out troops from the jaysh (military) tribes
and travel with them to some part of the bilad al makhzan,
extracting levies from the tribes there. Force was often
necessary. While many of the tribes recognized the sultan's
spiritual right to rule over them, they denied his right to
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tax them and resented having to support his entourage in
their territory.
However, by the nineteenth century the makhzan had become
a highly inefficient machine. With absolute power vested
theoretically in the monarch, all legislation was embodied in
his dahris (laws) . Government was conducted by five minis-
tries—interior, justice, finance, war, and foreign affairs.
The grand vizier, as the sultan's highest executive official,
was in effect equivalent to the prime minister of today's
Moroccan Parliament. He had the responsibility for tax
collection and internal security. Under the grand vizier
the pashas (governors of the cities) exercised their authority.
These offices were often hereditary and were reserved for
families who were powerful in a given locality. As long as
the revenues continued to come in and relative order prevailed,
the sultan placed no restriction on their actions.
The monarch's makhzan relied on personal relationships
rather than rigid procedures, and was organized on the basis
of tribal rather than territorial divisions. The traditional
struggle between the bilad al makhzan and the bilad al siba
did not alter the existing social and political structure.
Most Moroccans in the countryside continued to live within
the traditional framework of family, village, and tribe.
The contributions that the mahkzan gave to the estab-
lishment of the monarchy as a dominant political force were
significant, as they tended to reinforce the inherent
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monarchial characteristics of orchestrating and balancing
not only self interest, but that of the society as a whole.
The makhzan became the means by which the monarch achieved
his goals through more or less deceit. He controlled the
overall political situation; but rather than aggressively
dominate, he orchestrated the participation in that system
by the other political actors. His position became one of
supreme arbiter above the special interests of particular
groups and factions. This position was traditionally accepted
because for centuries, saints and saintly tribes were used
as judges and arbiters. The monarch was simply carrying on
tradition. However, the voice of the makhzan was in reality
the voice of the monarch, but members of the siba often failed
to realize this and the monarch appeared to them to be their
only spokesman against the dominant ambitions of their rivals,
the makhzan.
For such a role to have remained viable, the multi-
plicity of competing interests had equally to be maintained.
The unification of several interests into a single force
—
even one that supported the crown--was not in the interest
of the monarch. Not only would this have minimized competi-
tion, but it would also have created a base for eventual
unified opposition and thereby jeopardize the royal control
of the political system. Consequently, the monarch's rule
remained one of balancing, manipulation and orchestration;
all in the guise of the makhzan: an institution.
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4 . The Army
Huntington's last variable in the model is "the Army"
and its analysis will conclude this discussion on those insti-
tutions that characterize the essence of monarchial rule in
Morocco
.
Of the four institutions listed, the Army, while
important to an extent, was the least contributor to the formu-
lation of the early monarchy. However, its existence helped
enforce the activities of whatever ruler was in charge.
In early times armies were raised from Berber tribes
that had inherent warlike tendencies, i.e., the Sanhajas
(Tuaregs) , for the purpose of protecting the tribe or forcing
another into a confederation. Contractual arrangements were
made between the early 'monarchs' (Berber chieftans) and the
various groups of invaders that entered the country over the
centuries. These contracts, usually agreed upon for self
protection of the tribe and expansionist reasons by the in-
vaders, often were broken when the conqueror departed the
region and normal inter-tribal warfare resumed.
In later times, monarch after monarch recruited jaysh
military contingents to help in collecting taxes from dissi-
dent tribes. In exchange for their services the jaysh were
granted special land and tax concessions. In doing so, the
jaysh quickly became associated with the members of the Sultan's
elite group of followers, the makhzan which caused more than
one Sultan to lose his favor with the average Berber citizen.
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Religiously, the monarch raised armies at various
times to support Islamic revival through the use of force
(jihads) , because it was the traditional duty of the head
of state to enforce the laws of God--as laid down in the Quran
and the Hadith— among a less enlightened population. As a
result, the armies helped to strengthen the sultan's religious
legitimacy.
Beyond that mentioned above, the institution of the
military did not reach a significant level until much later
in Moroccan history, primarily after decolonization and the
rise of the current monarch. The Army has never been a
national institution serving as part of the apparatus of
government. It has continued to be one of monarchial origin
aimed at protecting and at times expanding the interests of
the king. In the next part of the thesis, it will be seen
as an organization that was allowed to grow beyond that level
traditionally required and as a result, almost succeeded in
eliminating the institution that begot it; the monarchy.
The preceeding four variables from Huntington's model
thus depict four critical institutions that characterize the
essence of traditional monarchial rule in Morocco. The
dominant of the four is the monarch and he represents the
second (the Church) . Helping him to continue his existence
are the third and fourth variables of the model; the makhzan
and the Army. Both have traditionally been simply extensions
of the monarch's will.
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In concluding the first section of the study, certain
aspects of traditional monarchial rule in Morocco stand out.
Its origins were begun through the throwing off of countless
waves of invaders by native Berber chieftans who cherished
individual liberty. These chieftans became 'monarchs' in
their onw rite and as later situations prevailed, their
status grew appreciably during the rise of the three great
Berber dynasties. After the coming of Islam with its goal of
uniting the individual state, and society, under the all-
powerful will of God (Allah) , the Muslim tradition of one-
man rule, a combined religious and political leadership
orthodoxy, was born.
From this point on in the development of the monarchy,
certain institutions and guiding principles emerged. The
monarch himself came to be the dominant institution in the
society because he represented the other critical one, Islam.
He was ruler because he was supernaturally qualified to be
so; the guiding principle being the requirement of descent
from the prophet. The kings elite following began to emerge
in the form of the makhzan; the central government of the
state, which allowed for the monarchy to achieve his will
without being perceived as directly doing so. It played the
scapegoat for the monarch's ambitions, and ironically, gave
him much popularity with the siba, the natural opponents of
the makhzan
.
Pre-1940 monarchial rule is best characterized as
an evolutionary stage that began from earliest recorded history
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In the second part of the thesis that follows, the post-1940
monarchy will be examined, keeping in mind those historical




III. THE MODERN MOROCCAN MONARCHY: POST- 19 4
To a certain extent, Morocco has always exhibited ele-
ments of modernity. While traditionalism and traditional
rule have served as the dominant unifying forces in Morocco
throughout its history, there have been other societal forces
at work as well. One example of such incipient modernizing
forces is the imazighan nature of Moroccans.
Traditional rule in Morocco gained new strength after
1940 and continues to be the main force behind social, politi-
cal and economic activity in the country. Increasingly, how-
ever, traditional influences are being challenged by the
reality of modernization.
This part of the study deals with the effects of moderni-
zation, primarily social and economic, on the traditional
monarchy of Morocco. It also examines the pressures that
were unleashed by the rise of Moroccan nationalism and the
end of French colonial rule. In 1940, France fell to Germany
and her grasp on this North African colony began to slip.
At that time, an authentic nationalist movement sprang up
with the monarchy as its unifying symbol and culminated in
the achievement of independence in 19 56. During the period
1940-1956, the strength of the Moroccan monarchy increased
substantially. Before examining those developments in detail,
we need to briefly review modernization theory.
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A. MODERN PRESSURES
1 . Implications of Modernization
While there are many theories of modernization, I
have chosen to use the works of David Apter and Samuel Hunting-
ton as the reference points for this study. Both Apter and
Huntington agree that "modernization is a process of increas-
ing complexity in human affairs within which the polity must
act" [Ref. 28]. As the world moves forward, pushed and pulled
by technological, social, political, and economic development, a
states' survival increasingly depends upon interaction with and
between groups. These interactions generate increasing com-
plexities. Complexity is both a consequence and a cause of
modernization. To survive, men have been led to organize
other men into groups that ultimately become states. The
emergence of social and political groups creates a need for
leadership. As Ibn Khaldun theorized, natural leaders
emerge because groups can only function effectively through
the emergence of an authority figure. In modern societies,
politics and politicans take on this leadership role. Social
and economic groups permit; indeed encourage the emergence
of political leaders who can act on behalf of larger collec-
tive interests.
The task of politics and politicans becomes, in
Apter 's words, "the business of coping with role differen-
tiation while integrating organization structures" [Ref. 29].
In Morocco, political leadership, and all the rights and
responsibilities that it entails, has been assumed by the
monarchy.
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To govern successfully, however, political leaders
require economic resources and, most importantly, legitimacy,
which in the broadest sense involves both cultural and politi-
cal support from within society. The problems associated with
maintaining its resource base and legitimacy remain the two
major challenges that the monarchy must face on a daily
basis. Modernization and implications it imposes has made
these hurdles much higher than they were when the monarchy
was developing during the rise of dynasties. During those
times, the monarch was the symbol of modernization itself, but
after the nationalist movement and decolonization it has,
according to many, become the obstacle. The nationalist move-
ment and decolonization are discussed below. It is impor-
tant at this point to note here that during the years 1940-
1956, these two political and social movements coincided
with the most rapid change in the Moroccan society experienced
in over a thousand years. This was because of modernization;
both social and to a lesser extent, economic.
Between the years 1940-1956, the traditional monarchy
reoriented itself for survival. As was discussed in the last
section, prior to 1940, politics in Morocco was the concern
of only a narrow elite. The makhzan headed by the monarch,
in addition to whatever foreign presence was in the country
at the time (most notably the French after 1912), controlled
the direction of the country in toto. After the fall of
France to Germany in 19 40, however, changes began to occur.
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Political parties sprang up, initially heralding the monarch
as their symbol (but concerned more with the legitimacy and
strength increased, these same political parties would come
to consider him their major source of opposition. The major
political party that rose to power on the shoulders of the
monarch was the Istiqlal and it will be discussed in more
detail in a later portion of the paper.
According to Huntington, "broadening political par-
ticipation is a hallmark of modernization" [Ref. 30]. In
Morocco this began to occur only after the Istiqlal party
started to grow and gain strength. As will be seen later,
Morocco has completed a cycle of sorts in respect to changing
national leadership roles that began in ancient times in the
person of the Berber Chieftans and changed back and forth over
the centuries between outside forces and native monarchs.
The monarchy has traditionally symbolized not only the religious
spirit of the country, but more importantly, its cultural
unity. Nowhere was this more evident than during the rise
of Mohammed V during the independence movement which resulted
in the establishment of the most powerful monarchy Morocco
had witnessed to that time.
As the world 'modernized' Morocco followed suit. Social
and economic modernization rapidly occurred which produced
broadened participation by members of the Bilad al Siba in
Morocco's affairs. Social modernization in the form of better
education was greatly responsible for the awakening of Morocco's
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masses. Prior to 1940, during their protectorate period,
France made efforts to 'Frenchify' Moroccans in similar
fashion to what they were doing in other North African coun-
tries. French schools were built and children of elites
were sent to learn French and the French way of life. Mem-
bers of the makhzan themselves received indoctrination on
the advantages of converting to what France considered then
(as it still does) , to be the most advanced culture on earth.
Later, and just prior to her overthrow by Germany, France
began a program designed to totally educate Morocco to French
ways, but partly because of the war, and also because of
the imazighan nature of the Moroccan native, the success of
France in respect to this effort was only marginal when com-
pared to similar efforts in Algeria, which was to become
considered more French than African. However, the effects
of the French presence are glaringly visible in Morocco today
with the 'unofficial' language of the government being French
rather than the native Arabic/Berber dialect.
After the fall of France in 1940, education saw a
downturn until independence in 1956. According to Hermassi,
"access to modern education was extremely limited, between
1912 and 19 55, scarcely over 1,000 Moroccan youths pursued
secondary schooling and obtained a baccalaureat degree" [Ref.
31] . Moreover, most of these 1,000 included elites or child-
ren of elites, reinforcing the argument hence that the tradi-
tional monarch saw in modern education a means to his demise
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and hence intentionally limited educational opportunities. That
the current literacy rate is only 20% in a supposedly 'modernizing'
state, is a fact that speaks for itself [Ref. 32]. The effects
of social modernization caused by expanding access to educa-
tion on the Moroccan monarchial rule are not clear-cut. No
formal education, outside of sporadic schooling of some mem-
bers of the elite circle around the monarch, existed prior to
the French coming in 1912. Hence modernity, in terms of
social mobilization, characterized in this sense by an educated
mass moving from little or no knowledge of the workings of
the country (or care either) to a position where new knowledge
caused a concern for their country and how it was run, had
not begun. During this period the monarch was firmly in con-
trol because he was the most educated. Traditionally, the
sharifs and other wandering holymen (marabouts) had been held
in high esteem for their knowledge. Knowledge, to native
Berbers, translated into power, which they understood. A
sharif was powerful because he knew more than anyone else.
This belief was further nurtured by the monarch until the
French arrived in 1912 and, as has been stated, it continued
to be supported during the protectorate period but to a
lessening degree than it was previously. French schooling
and indoctrination did open the eyes of many Moroccans, but
to the monarch's credit, only to those he chose. Thus, during
this period the leadership of Morocco continued, as far as
Moroccans were concerned, with the monarch, but with French
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supervision and influence. The French had made the mistake
of giving the monarch approval authority on all actions of
state to include educational activities in its treaty with
Morocco in 1912. This of course was initially to legitimize
their presence in the country, but it was later to hamper
solidification of their control and further limit their
influence on the natives in the country.
As the French demise began after 19 40, some educated
Moroccans, once the staunchest supporter of their monarch,
began to let individual thought replace traditional loyalty.
This will be discussed to some extent in the next portion of
the paper, but presently it is important to note the initial
effects that an educated elite began to have on the entrenched
position of the monarch. At first, the educated makhzan
buttressed the position of the monarch because they needed
him to legitimize their nationalist activities which ulti-
mately saw the formulation of political parties. However,
as their position strengthened and outside opposition faded
they became a formidable opponent to the monarch himself.
This opposition reached its peak during the early years
(1961-19 72) of the present monarch's reign. During this
period King Hassan II saw the status of the monarch repeatedly
challenged by Army officers educated at French and other
western universities. Many of these officers were children
of the educated elite that had risen to power during 19 40-
1956. How Hassan handled this problem is the subject matter
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of a later portion of this paper. What can be presently
said, however, is that the Hassan monarchy, though severely
weakened in comparison to its 1956 position, did turn the
cycle around that ultimately would have led to the demise of
the monarchy itself. After certain reorganizations and firm
responses to challenges that the educated elite presented,
the monarchy reestablished itself and once again took over
direct control of educational activities of the country thus
ending the increasing influence of the educated elite and
returned it to a level almost comparable to pre-protectorate
days
.
In concluding this analysis of the effects of education
on the modernization of Morocco, certain points need to be
reiterated. New governmental and economic systems, introduced
by the French into Moroccan society, opened expansive new
opportunities for the minority equipped with French education.
Although Europeans (French mostly) staffed the majority of
the governmental institutions before independence, the de-
mand for trained Moroccans became insatiable for a few years
after 1956. Those able to assume important posts in the
modern economic, governmental, and cultural structure
immediately constituted a powerful new bourgeois elite which
ultimately aimed its sights on the downfall of the monarchy
itself.
The introduction of modern educational and other
institutions drastically increased opportunities for social
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mobility through education and technical expertise which the
relatively static traditional system had provided few possi-
bilities for. Because of these changes, many of the older
traditional elite now find themselves stripped of the influ-
ence, and often, of the income they formerly enjoyed. Once,
a class of religious dignitaries and families claiming descent
from the prophet formerly occupied the social pinnacle, along
with the wealthy landowning and merchant families of the
Bilad al Makhzan. Now, however, this is not the case. Al-
though devotion to Islam remains strong, some traditional
religious teachings and institutions have lost prestige with
the advance of European culture and education. The monarch
has continually had to fend for his existence since 1912 in
regard to the challenges that educational modernization has
confronted him with.
Another example of pressures that the modernization
brought to bear on the stability of the traditional monarchy
in Morocco was the increased social mobilization, due in
great part to education, that took place in Morocco during
the protectorate period, and which expanded even more
rapidly after independence.
Both Apter and Huntington see the process of social
mobilization in terms of its effects on politics. Huntington
sees the relationship between social mobilization (or urbani-
zation) as being "reasonably direct" [Ref. 33]. He theorizes
that urbanization, caused by increased capabilities in
literacy, education, and media exposure, cause an increase
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in expectations of the educated mass which, if unsatisfied,
leads to the formulation of political parties. As the edu-
cated native moves to urban areas and joins with other edu-
cated natives, political notions are bound to emerge, especially
if the native is out of work or is facing some other economic
or social hardship. These political aspirations often, ac-
cording to Apter, lead to the promotion of "unrealistic
industrialization goals which rely heavily on coercion" [Ref.
34] , causing not only problems for the urban mass but equal
problems for the ruling monarch.
The effects of urbanization on Morocco in terms of
its impact on the social, economic, and political institu-
tions of the country is a study in itself. For the purpose
of this paper, only a brief narrative will be given on the
effects of urbanization on Moroccan society and most impor-
tantly, the monarchy itself.
The cities of Morocco have grown explosively during
the course of the twentieth century, the process resulting
in a collection of urban centers populated largely by coun-
try folk or at best by people very recently acclimated to
city ways by way of education in large Moroccan or European
cities. Each year Casablanca absorbs thousands of rural
dwellers and transforms them into city people. For this,
Casablanca is often called an "urbanizing machine" [Ref. 35].
Coming from many regions and social environments, the migrants
have little shared culture or consciousness, and the new
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centers such as Casablanca, Kenitra, and Agadir are cities
without tradition.
Urban growth in Morocco was the result of the wide-
spread adoption of European culture began during the protec-
torate period. Because of this, the growth of the cities
has been more than a new accretion of population. The various
sections of many of the cities were built before, during,
and after the protectorate period; and most are inhabited by
groups with widely differing values and ways.
The traditional city, the medina, was made up of
several derbs, or quarters. Each of these units housed a
number of families who had resided in that place for several
generations and who were bound by a feeling of solidarity and
common identification. Ibn Khaldun called this "Asabyjah"
[Ref. 36]. Families of every economic standing lived in the
same quarter, with the wealthy and the notable assuming leader-
ship; who were more often than not, a member of the makhzan.
The arrival of the French disturbed the equilibrium
of urban life. Unaccustomed to the ways of traditional
Morocco, they built their suburban new cities along European
lines. A growing number of Moroccasn began to copy Europeans
in dress and in other ways of life. European mass-produced
products came into increasingly general use, and local arti-
sans were either driven out of business or forced into reduced
circumstances. Many of the elite moved to the new suburbs,
and the old city gradually turned into neighborhoods for the
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poor, while residential segregation by class and income be-
came important for the first time. An excellent account of
this can be found in Elizabeth Fernea ' s study of medina life
in her book, A Street in Marrakech : New York, Anchor Press,
1980. In place of the old residential divisions, based
principally on ethnic background, the distinctions between
residential neighborhoods became those of class.
As mentioned earlier, the new political and economic
system introduced by the French into Moroccan society, opened
expansive new opportunities for the minority equipped with a
French education. This minority later emerged as a powerful
new bourgeois elite that was recruited both from prominent
families and from ambitious youths of modest social origin.
A new middle class was thus produced which "legitimized its
attained social position by conspicuous consumption of expen-
sive European-style consumer goods, such as swimming pools,
lavish modern villas, fashionable clothing, and contemporary
furniture" [Ref . 37]
.
The introduction of modern institutions drastically
increased opportunities for social mobility through education
and technical expertise; the relatively static traditional
system had provided few possibilities for social movement.
Nevertheless, by the time the current monarch assumed the
throne in 1961, the job market had become glutted with a far
greater surplus of university graduates than it could absorb
into acceptable white-collar work. Liberal arts graduates
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were abundant, but technical skills such as engineering and
other sciences were lacking owing in part to the elites' dis-
dain for 'working with one's hands.' Consequently, although
French and other European technicians held important techni-
cal posts for which trained Moroccans could not be found, the
schools continued to produce applicants for white-collar
positions that did not exist. In the 1970's, many young
people feared that the status for which their education was
to prepare them would prove illusory along with the oppor-
tunities for social mobility to which they believed indepen-
dence entitled them. They saw furtner obstacles in their
path in the form of the monarchy itself which resulted in
one instance in mass student rioting in Casablanca during
which fourteen students were killed on a 'shoot to kill'
order by the monarch himself.
Other problems for the monarch that social mobiliza-
tion and urbanization brought about were equally significant.
Although industrial technology provided enviable opportuni-
ties for some, it did not offer them to all. As mass produc-
tion replaced handicrafts, many skilled artisans, who formerly
occupied respectable positions in the community, were re-
duced to being factory workers. Others managed to stay in
business by changing their style or producing for the grow-
ing tourist trade. Related changes occurred in the rural
areas cultivated by the French settlers, where tribesmen
became laborers for commercial farms.
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Although some rural migrants had lost all roots in
the traditional culture, others exploited their tribal connec-
tions to help in adjusting to city life. The serious shortage
of jobs prevented most new arrivals from finding work on
their own. In most cases those who succeeded in getting an
industrial position did so through a network of tribesmen
or relatives already employed in industry. "Often whole
sections or departments of factories were staffed by men of
the same tribe, village, or region, who are hired by an em-
ployed kinsman or friend" [Ref. 38].
Many new arrivals who were unable to find any settled
work swelled the ranks of underemployed, performing tasks of
little economic value. Large numbers of peddlers crowded
the sidewalks of cities selling snacks, trinkets, and other
objects for little profit. These individuals, although
scarcely supporting themselves, avoided the demeaning ad-
mission that they had no trade. Unknowingly they provided
a much greater service to the educated dissidents who used
them as examples of the impotency of the traditional values
of the country as represented by the monarchy.
Instability and violence often developed during the
protectorate period but after independence they increased
markedly. The initial target of educated dissidents were
the French themselves but when independence came new sights
were set on the monarch himself, thus exemplifying, once again,
the imazighan nature of the Moroccan native. As was seen in
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Part One, when Berbers were not rising against outside in-
vaders, they were actively involved in fighting amongst
themselves. The colonial experience and subsequent inde-
pendence was simply another revolution of the cycle that has
repeated itself countless times over three thousand years.
What is important to understand is that the monarchy survived
then and continues to do so now. How this was accomplished
will be discussed later.
Economically, modernization has been far slower than
that of education and the social ' imobilization ' it has caused
today, and remains the chief obstacle in Morocco's achievement
of a modern society. In 19 83 Morocco continues to have a
centralized, dualistic, underdeveloped economy, somewhat
modestly endowed with natural resources and faced with a
number of difficult economic problems that were inherited
along with independence in 1956. Economic modernization
since independence has been commendable considering the diffi-
culties in which it has had to cope. Economic decision making
and other broad powers have been centralized in the person of
the king, which has made for unusual consistency and con-
tinuity of the country's economic policy. This centralization
has probably been the single source of progress since inde-
pendence and may be expected to continue to be so, although
it has posed some related political problems. Ironically,
modernization being considered the enemy of traditionalism
economically speaking, has seen its advancement in a tradi-
tional-type system.
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On this issue, Waterbury has suggested that the
monarchy was unwilling to sponsor dynamic programs of economic
development that would have as one of their results a certain
amount of social and economic upheaval" [Ref. 39]. This was
probably the case immediately after independence when Mohammed
V struggled to solidify his control of the country. However,
as the ecstasy of liberation from French domination died,
down, unemployed educated Moroccans, through a variety of
disruptions, caused the monarch to centralize the economic
decision making in his person.
While it is not the scope of this paper to present a
detailed economic history of the country, certain points in
regard to the economic modernization of the country and its
effect on the stability of the monarchy are important.
Morocco's economy has traditionally been an agrarian
one. With the continuing growth of the cities and town, how-
ever, agricultural employment has suffered a relative decline,
but by 19 83 the bulk of the population was still dependent
on farming for its livelihood. Waterbury stated that in 1968,
"over 6 5 percent of active Moroccans were dependent upon agri-
culture for a living and about 45 percent of Morocco's foreign
earnings come through the export of agricultural produce and
from products" [Ref. 40]. Owing partly to rural migration
to urban centers, by 19 81 census records reflected a drop to
50 percent of the active population being engaged in the
agricultural sector. Foreign earnings from agricultural
exports dropped slightly to 40 percent due in most part to
the severe drought that hit Morocco in 19 79 [Ref. 41].
The relative decline in agricultural employment oc-
curred as more and more young people left the farms in search
of the better employment opportunities believed available in
the cities and towns. Many turned to mine-working in Morocco's
phosphate mines which now account for about 2 5 percent of its
export earnings [Ref. 42], All other sectors of economic
activity have enjoyed marginal gains from 1961 to the present.
Major gains were to be found in sales and in personnel and
other service activities. Manufacturing employment increased
moderately, but industry was not able to absorb the bulk of
the urban migrants. Unemployment of the modern educated,
and those not so well equipped inhabitants, continues to be
a thorn in the side of the current monarchy. What Hassan is
doing about this will be discussed later.
The effects of slow economic growth on the planned
modernization of the country after independence is not clear-
cut. What is evident is that it certainly hampered it, but
Waterbury's assumption that the failure for Morocco to
modernize economically only aided the continuance of the
monarchy itself, might well be the case in retrospect. Also
apparent is the fact that mounting economic pressures, caused
by unemployment, which has grown from 9 percent to 25 percent
from 1956 to 19 83, has caused the monarchy to face the issues
and seek solutions to this and other economic problems. No
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longer can these problems be simply ignored. Too many dis-
satisfied citizens, many important, and often members of the
king's own court, have demanded relief from the burdens that
a hungry and out of work mass bring. Unemployment and
economic deprivation are only two of the many social problems
that have developed into political ones for the current
monarch. His efforts at handling these pressures will be
examined in the next portion of the paper.
In conclusion on the topic on the implications of
modernization on the monarchy, certain points require reiter-
ation. Education of elites by the French resulted in an in-
creased awareness of their surroundings. Education allowed
for social mobility in the form of physical movement from
rural areas to large urban centers and also in societal move-
ment for many, up the ladder of politics into positions of
increasing importance. Each advancement by the native
created new pressures for the monarch to contend with. His
situation is characterized best, by Apter, when he describes
the contemporary monarch of Morocco as being one of a
"modernizing autocracy; where the king tends to have a tradi-
tionalist idealogy associated with his rule and he attempts
to retain the power at the top" [Ref . 43] . As a 'modernizing
autocratic, 1 Hassan has had to redefine traditional roles in
order to face mounting pressures for change. His new means of
asserting authority, according to Apter, is to use his tradi-
tional position as the legitimization for change rather than
the opponet of it [Ref. 44], This is a curious twist but it
has substantial merit in that it currently appears that this
is exactly what Hassan is doing. His reliance on his religious
position of authority as a means of remaining the dominant
force of the country is increasing and with new economic and
social programs aimed at bettering the life of the native
(a totally uncharacteristic monarchial act prior to Hassan)
,
and with each one being declared in keeping with Islam, Hassan
is only furthering the legitimization of his office.
Huntington, on the other hand, who also agrees with
Apter's modernizing monarchy concept, gives three alternatives
in long-range strategy that a traditional king may employ in
facing the challenge of modernization. First, the role of
the monarchy may be reduced and replaced by a truly consti-
tutional monarchy or ended altogether, resulting in a system
where authority rests with the people through political par-
ties and representative institutions. Secondly, the attempt
may be made to develop a new system that combines monarchial
and popular authority. Finally, the attempt may be made to
preserve the traditional monarchy, minimizing the disruptive
effects on it that will be caused by economic development and
general modernization [Ref. 45].
The first alternative can be eliminated in the case
of Morocco, but whether Hassan subscribes to either of the
remaining two alternatives is unclear. It would appear at
the present time that the monarchy has chosen the third
alternative of maintaining the traditional system while
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minimizing modernization's disfunctional effects upon it.
In this vein the massive foreign borrowing for economic
development purposes that Morocco has undertaken to help feed
its unemployed and put them back to work could be seen as an
attempt to purchase a 'ready made' economic development plan
from external sources, rather than attempting to achieve the
same end through internal reforms and fundamental modifica-
tion of the existing domestic socio-politico-economic system.
Finally, modernization is a relatively contemporary
concept as far as Morocco is concerned. While other nations
were industrializing a hundred years before, Morocco did not
begin to actually see a basic advancement in its society until
the protectorate period and even more so after independence
in 1956. The events leading up to independence were combined
in the Moroccan Nationalist movement which is the scope of
the next portion of the study.
2 . The Nationalist Movement
The Nationalist movement in Morocco had its beginnings
in the French attempts to modernize Morocco which resulted in
the social, economic and political pressures that were brought
to bear on the monarchy. More importantly, this movement
brought about the establishment of Moroccan political forces
and ultimately lead to decolonization in 1956. The purpose
of this section is to examine the Nationalist movement with
emphasis given to its causes of occurrence and ultimate
effects on the stability of the monarchy.
Due to the increasing urbanization of Morocco, the
so-called new towns (villes nouvelles) --mushroomed during the
1920's and 1930 's. Modern sanitation, hygiene, and medical
facilities were introduced for the French population and
gradually reached out to the Moroccan population as well.
As previously discussed, this development was hastened by
the growth of. suburban slums (bidonvilles) around the cities
where rural Moroccans had migrated in search of work.
Also during this time the French educational system
was introduced intact for the children of the French colonial-
ists (colons). As the educational facilities expanded, the
number of Moroccan children attending the French-Administered
school steadily increased, but a parallel, modernized school
system using Arabic was not developed. Arabic was thereby
confined to the study of classical literature and religion
in Moroccan schools. The operation of the government, the
economy and the educational system all demanded the use of
French (and this is still occurring today) . Although rela-
tively few Moroccans achieved university educations, a small
Western-educated elite, oriented toward French culture, came
into existence. It was against this backdrop, that the
nationalist movement first took root in the mid 1920 *s.
Moroccan nationalism stemmed from the merger of two
reform movements that had appeared in the early 19 20's and
whose aims, originally unrelated, later became intertwined.
The first was a religious reform movement, the Salafiya, which
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grew up among the ulama and students associated with the
ancient Karaouine University at Fes. Its members advocated
the fundamentalist ideals originally preached by Islamic
reformers in the late nineteenth century. While retaining
the essential spiritual and moral values of Islam, the
Salafiya also sought to adapt Moroccan society to the re-
quirements of the modern world by using the tools of Western
technology. By 1925 Salafiya schools had opened in several
cities to spread knowledge of Arabic and Islamic culture,
which had been ignored in the French schools [Ref. 46].
The first truly nationalist political movement arose
in 1925 among French-educated students in Rabat who founded
secret societies to spread opposition to the growing inter-
vention of the French administration. By 1927 societies
combining the aims of religious reform and the assertion of
Morocco's political independence were being formed throughout
the country, and by 19 30 the future leaders of the nationalist
movement had already become well known through their activi-
ties in these groups. Allal al Fassi assumed leadership of
the Salafiya movement, while Ahmed Balafrej , one of the
founders of the Rabat group, went to Paris to gain the sup-
port of the French socialists. Mohammed Hassan Wazzini
was a university student in Paris at the time and in contact
with Shakib Arslan, the Lebanese apostle of the pan-Islamic
movement, who was the mentor of nationalists throughout North
Africa and the Middle East [Ref. 47]. According to Waterbury,
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during this time, "religion and nationalism found common
ground within Morocco, and because much the same phenomenon
was taking place in the rest of the Arab world, Moroccan
nationalists received a certain measure of international
support at strategic moments" [Ref. 48].
According to Waterbuy, the prime example of this was
the promulgation in 19 30 of the so-called Berber dahir (law)
that got the Nationalist movement off the ground. The promul-
gation of the Berber law converted what had been an isolated
elite-based movement into a popular force aggressively opposed
to continued French rule. The French administration claimed
that the dahir was intended to modernize the complex Moroccan
legal system by ending the judicial powers formerly exercised
over the Berber tribes by the caids appointed by the makhzan.
These powers were shifted to the traditional representative
Berber community councils. The effect of this step, however,
would have been to further reduce the authority of the makhzan
and to strengthen the autonomy of the Berber tribes. National-
ists saw in it another attempt by the French to divide the
Berber and Arab elements of the population in order to more
easily impose French control by deliberately revising the old
divisions between the bilad al makhzan and bilad al siba under
overall French authority. The supporters of Islamic orthodoxy
were incensed by what they took to be a threat to Islam in
the strengthening of Berber customary law at the expense of
the sharia. Public demonstration against the dahir spread
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rapidly to all Moroccan cities and led to the arrest of
nationalist leaders.
The French had managed to bring together all the
diverse strands of Moroccan politics at the time in opposi-
tion to the Berber dahir. Protests against the measure were
made all ov.er the Muslim world in response to the publicity
given the dahir by Arslan and the Moroccan nationalists in
Paris, influencing the French government to instruct the resi-
dent general not to enforce it. Although the protest move-
ment quickly subsided, the proof it had given of the depth of
Moroccan opposition to the French encouraged the nationalists
to organize on a more ambitious scale [Ref. 49].
In December 19 34, a small group of nationalists
—
members of the newly formed Moroccan Action Committee
(Comitee Action Morocaine—CAM)
—
proposed the long, detailed
plan of Reforms, which they submitted simultaneously to the
sultan, the resident general, and the French foreign ministry.
The plan called for a return to indirect rule as envisaged
by the Treaty of Fes, unification of the judicial systems of
Morocco, elimination of the judicial functions of caids and
pashas, admission of Moroccans to government positions, and
the establishment of representative councils. The signatories
included the recognized leaders of Moroccan Nationalism:
Fassi, Balafre j , Mohammed Lyazidi, Wazzini, Mekki Nacerf,
Mohammad Douiri, Abdilaziz ben Driss, Ahmed Cherkaoui and
Ahmed Mekouor [Ref. 50].
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The success of CAM was shortlived, however, due to a
split in its organization caused by the failure of its 'Plan
for Reform. ' Wazzini withdrew from the movement and took with
him most of the traditionalists. The remainder of the organi-
zation reorganized behind Fasi into a more radical nationalist
political party and in 1937 caused several violent incidents
to occur that forced the French to intervene and suppress the
party. Fassi was arrested and exiled to Gabon, where he re-
mained until 1946. Wazzini, whose splinter group was pro-
scribed, was also sent into exile.
According to Waterbury, "the founders of the national-
ist movement had no fixed methods, and until 19 44, indepen-
dence was not one of their declared objectives" [Ref. 51].
Early attempts to organize and to politic were sporadic.
Until CAM, the nationalist movement in Morocco was in name
only.
During World War II the badly split Moroccan national-
ist movement became more cohesive. The French defeat in 1940,
the enunciation of the Atlantic Charter the next year, and
the subsequent promise of independence held out to Syria and
Lebanon encouraged educated Moroccans to consider the real
possibility of political change in the postwar era. At the
outbreak of war, Mohammed V had pledged Moroccan support to
France and its allies. After the fall of France, he continued
to give his personal loyalty to the allies and he refused to
receive German representatives in Morocco. He also declined
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to issue a Vichy-initiated decree aimed at persecution of
Jews and withheld support for the pro-Vichy resident general
in his attempted resistence to the allied landings in
Morocco in November 1942. During the Casablanca Conference
in January 194 3, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill met with the sultan separately from French authori-
ties. Waterbury comments that Roosevelt also met privately
with Mohammed V and "led the sultan to believe that he would
use his good offices to promote Moroccan independence follow-
ing the war" [Ref. 52]. Nationalist leaders, most notably
Omar Abdjellil, Ahmad Balafrej , and Muhammed Lyazidi, took
this as a signal for the time being appropriate to demand
complete independence from France. Secret meetings between
them and the monarchy began to regularly take place, with not
only independence as a subject, but the nature of the future
political regime of Morocco as well. Mohammed agreed with
the nationalists that further interaction with the French was
fruitless, but he also emphasized that he could not come out
openly and support statements to this effect. He felt that
this would lead to his deposition and that if this occurred,
the symbol that he represented (and in fact, the primary one)
to the nationalist movement itself, would be lost. He did
promise to shield the nationalists from any form of prosecu-
tion by the Vischy government officials through his continuing
right to deny French government activities by way of the
required signature approval granted to his office in the 1912
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treaty. Once again, that treaty had come back to haunt the
French.
Also discussed privately by the monarchy and the
nationalists was the nature of the future Moroccan government
A constitutional monarchy was discussed during this time and
the monarch agreed to the principle of a democratic monarch
but felt that the talk of an actual 'constitution 1 would be
premature and that the most important job at hand was the
uniting of all Moroccans behind his throne in order to suc-
cessfully meet the certain future challenges that the end
of the war would bring. He felt that the notion of a consti-
tution would be too radical for the traditional members of
the makhzan to comprehend and accept [Ref. 53].
The tentative understandings and agreements between
the Nationalist leaders and the monarch that were reached
during these secret discussions led to the establishment of
the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. This party initially
headed by Balafrej and Lyazidi, led a group of veteran
nationalists who were joined by young urban intellectuals and
middle-class Moroccans. At its first conference in Rabat in
January 1944, the Istiqlal issued a manifesto demanding full
independence, national reunification and a democratic consti-
tution. The sultan had received and approved the manifesto
before its submission to the French resident general who
answered that, while political and social reforms would be
granted, no basic change in the protectorate status was being
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considered. ' The general principles of reform that he voiced
were categorically rejected by the Istiqlal. When, a few
days later, eighteen Istiqlal leaders including Balafrej and
Lyazidi were arrested on trumped-up charges of having
collaborated with the Germans, resulting violent demonstrations
were directed against the French administration.
Other nationalist parties were formed during this
period and immediately after the end of the war. On his
return from exile, Wazzini formed the Democratic Party of
Independence (Parti Democratique de 1 ' Independence--PDI) , thus
preserving the split in the nationalist movement created in
the mid 19 30 *s [Ref . 54].
What had become evident by this time was the general
sympathy of the sultan with the nationalists although he
still hoped to see complete independence achieved gradually;
partly for his own gain and also because he knew Morocco was
not stable enough to survive immediate withdrawal of French
and organization. This is an appropriate juncture to more
closely examine the interaction between the monarch and the
nationalists up until this time.
During the 19 20's, the sultan was not considered a
necessity by young intellectuals having nationalist thoughts.
He was, in fact, seen as an impotent figurehead and a tool
of the French. French leaders had in fact handpicked Mohammed
who was a third son, for his seemingly docile nature. They
felt that he would be easily manipulated and controlled as
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long as he remained as the monarch and the monarchy remained
under the French thumb. When Mohammed signed the Berber
dahir in 19 30, which in essence split the country into several
sections and was aimed at disunity of Morocco, the nationalists
gave this as further evidence of the weakness of the monarchy.
As the nationalists grew in strength and caused alarm in the
French, the monarch was asked (by the French) to condemn the
nationalist movement as a danger to the traditional rule of
the country. In actuality it was the French rule, and tradi-
tionalism played little part in the political running of the
country during this time. Nationalist leaders began a series
of propaganda to refute the French accusations of their dis-
loyalty to the monarch which resulted in Mohammed V changing
his mind about their intentions but more importantly, those of
the French. On Throne Day, 18 November 1933, loyalty to the
sultan was demonstrated by nationalists in peaceful gatherings
in his honor. In Fes in 19 34, a large demonstration was
held on the occasion of the sultan's visit there, to glorify
him and to further show their support of his office. Many
see this as the critical juncture where the monarchy and the
nationalists joined hands and from this point on, the strug-
gle for independence which ended victoriously in 19 56, was
a combined effort [Ref. 55].
But the benefits of this alliance were far greater
to the sultan. Up until this time the sultan was physically
isolated from his subjects and had no way in which to curb
the erosion of his authority, by the French. He saw in the
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nationalists new strength and willingness to support the
integrity of the throne. On the other hand, the nationalists
found, in the monarch, a cause for their movement. The
monarchy was a symbol of Morocco's threatened sovereignty
and the mass public response that his personage evoked could
not be generated by the nationalists themselves. Both depended
on each other early on, but unwittingly, while the nationalists
were "successfully building the image of the sultan as the
most prominent symbol of the struggle for independence, they
were at the same time, giving him the ability to act autono-
mously, and to rise above what would later be termed 'partial
interests' (i.e., the Istiqlal) and 'political factions'"
[Ref. 56J . This quote from' Waterbury accurately summarizes
the effects the nationalist movement had on the monarch.
Other occurrences that characterized the nationalist
movement was the actual struggle for independence that began
in earnest in 1945. In that year the French residency,
supported by French economic concerns and most of the colons,
adamantly refused to consider even those reforms the national-
ists demanded, short of independence.
This game of hardball on the part of France, by 1946,
had widened the split between the nationalists and the colons
and gradually between the sultan and the resident general
.
In 1946 a liberal resident general proposed a series of re-
forms aimed at improving living conditions and giving Moroccans
a greater voice in their government. But by then nothing short
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of independence would satisfy the nationalists. In deference
to them, the sultan withheld his signature from the dahirs
that would have implemented the reforms.
Another important event was the sultan's trip to
Tangier, during which a riot broke out in Casablanca and
several Moroccans were killed by French soldiers. . Because of
this, while in Tangier, the sultan made his first public plea
for national unity and eventual self government, instead of
the planned speech on the benefits of French rule, In response
to this speech, the French appointed a more conservative
resident general, General Alphons Juin.
Juin quickly decreed a governmental reorganization
aimed at further weakening the makhzan and made statements
intended to discredit the sultan. He refused to promulgate
a decree issued by the sultan as imam, limiting the activi-
ties of the religious brotherhoods. The sultan in turn re-
fused to sign most of the decrees presented to him by Juin,
nearly all of them designed to limit his authority. This
veto power, established by the 1912 Treaty of Fes, once again
proved to be the nationalists', now represented by the monarch,
major weapon as the Istiqlal intensified its public con-
demnation of the oppressive French rule.
Between 19 50 and 19 53, mounting tension between the
monarch and the French was evidenced in several ways. The
sultan doggedly refused to sign measures that would have
further reduced his power. In 1952 riots in Casablanca, aris-
ing from proletarian nationalist reaction to the murder of a
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Tunisian labor leader, sparked the start of a new era in
Moroccan politics. In clashes between Moroccan rioters and
police, an estimated 400 people were killed. In the after-
math of the riots, the PCM, the new Moroccan Communist Party
(Parti Communiste Morocain) which had recently formed, and
the Istiqlal were outlawed by the residency. In 1953 the
most significant event in recent Moroccan history occurred--
the exile of Mohammed V and his family to Madagascar.
Mohammed V had refused to sign away his powers to the French
and he was therefore deposed, arrested and sent into exile by
the resident general. The French summoned the ulama to
approve in the traditional fashion the nomination of a new
sultan, Mohammed Mulay Ben Arafa, an aged member of the
Alawi house.
The results of Mohammed's deposition were profound.
It enraged not only the nationalists but all those who recog-
nized the sultan as the religious leader of the country.
Never had the country been so solidly united behind the
monarchy or national sentiment so aroused. French attempts
to bolster Ben Arafa failed and their status as political
leaders in Morocco began to rapidly erode at this point.
By the end of 1952, when it was banned, the Istglal
had an active membership of over 80,000 and a mass organiza-
tion of several hundred thousand more. After Mohammed V's
exile, incidents of terrorism occurred with increasing fre-
quency. By 1955, Moroccan guerrillas had been organized by
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a kinsman of Istiqlal leader Allal al Fassi into the Army
of National Liberation (Armee de Liberation Nationale--ALN)
,
numbering several thousand, and were openly engaging in com-
bat against French troops and were attacking the colons. As
the French negotiated with various Moroccan leaders in the
hope of finding a solution to the problems, Berber attacks
continued, persuading the resident general to notify France
of his intent to allow Mohammed to return to Morocco from
exile. Considering the level of hostility at the time, it
was his only hope at continuance of French authority in the
country [Ref. 57]. Thus, the Nationalist movement in Morocco
had seen its ultimate goal achieved. Independence occurred
shortly thereafter, and the process of de-colonization began
which is discussed in the next portion of this study.
The nationalist movement in Morocco united the country
behind the monarch. The original goal of nationalist leaders
(a totally democratic and constitutional system of govern-
ment) was not achieved. This was due in part, as Waterbury
explained, to the emphasis placed on the monarchy as a means
of legitimizing the nationalist movement. Nevertheless,
the movement's contribution to a united Morocco was signifi-
cant and cannot be understated. The nationalist movement made
the monarch what he is today and established the beginnings
of an alternative form of government that is reaching new
levels of strength at a rapidly increasing rate. While the
attempt of this paper is to determine the effects of political
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change on the traditional monarchy, primarily through a study
of the pressures brought to bear on the throne and its subse-
quent response to these pressures, it is important to conclude
here that the nationalist movement in Morocco did help change
the political structure of the country from colonial rule to
independent rule. But more importantly, the pressures brought
to bear on the monarch were those of assuming rule and not
those of struggling to achieve it. The nationalists did that
for him.
3 . Decolonization
Independence from French rule brought about the physi-
cal process of decolonization as well as other implications
that were to be of significant impact on the workings of the
monarchy. How the monarchy survived pressures brought about
by independence is the subject matter of the next part of the
study. This section deals briefly with the decolonization
process itself that the French, and also Moroccan nationalists,
underwent upon the return of Mohammed V to Morocco.
In October 19 55, a policy of Moroccan 'independence
with interdependence * was adopted by the French National
Assembly. At the same time the French legislature affirmed
that the Treaty of Fes should remain the basis of French-
Moroccan relations. Restating the principle of Moroccan
sovereignty it was agreed that Morocco should exercise fully
all the powers and authority stipulated by the treaty that
had been held in obeyance. It was insisted, however, that
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France should continue its responsibility for Moroccan defense
and foreign policy and that the French presence in Morocco
should be permanent and acknowledged by the full representa-
tion of French settlers in Moroccan affairs [Ref. 57].
Mohammed V was received in Paris with full honors on
October 31, 1955. There he rejected the French position out
of hand but continued negotiations until agreement was
reached on November 6 . Although the Treaty of Fes was not
formally abrogated, provision was made for a gradual restora-
tion of Moroccan independence within the framework of a
guarantee of mutual rights and permanent ties of French-
Moroccan interdependence. The sultan agreed to institute
reforms to change Morocco into a democratic state under a
constitutional monarch. He returned to Morocco in triumph
and, after consultation with spokesmen of the several politi-
cal parties and labor movement (both of which grew in size
and strength during his absence) , entrusted a nonparty
politician, Embarek Bekkai, with the task of forming a
cabinet. The old ministerial system of the makhzan was
abandoned and the Council of Ministers was formed on the
basis of the administrative structure created by the French.
The new cabinet was sworn in, and government functions were
transferred gradually from the French residency. A system
that had its beginnings in 1912 was finally ended.
The French system, which saw its origin in the Treaty
of Fes in 1912 was in reality a rather efficient one, but
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was limited, as evidenced before, in the veto power it gave
the monarch. Under the terms of the Treaty of Fes, the
resident general acted in a dual role. He was the supreme
representative of the French Republic, but he was also the
sultan's minister of war and foreign affairs and was respon-
sible for all government operations [Ref . 58]. The first
resident general, General Marshal Lyautey's policy was to
preserve traditional institutions and provide guidance for
Morocco in the economic and political spheres. But even
during Lyautey's time, official French circles were beginning
to favor the policy of direct control rather than advisory.
This trend was later evidenced in other North African French
colonies; the most obvious in Algeria. Lyautey came under
much attack from French politicians favoring colonization
of Morocco because of the dual civilian and military type
system of rule he had established. After Lyautey's dismissal,
Moroccan traditionalists had lost their staunchest supporter
and subsequent resident generals reduced Morocco for all
practical purposes to the status of a French colony.
Lyautey's successors progressively introduced direct
French administration and although care was taken to preserve
the paraphernalia of his authority, the sultan became a mere
figurehead. The makhzan had no real powers, and the caids
and pashas became merely the executive assistants of the
French regional administrations [Ref. 59]. The Moroccan
central government did, however, have a structure.
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The central government was composed of the grand
vizier, who was nominally the sultan's premier and minister
of the interior insofar as he had supervision over pashas
and caids, the minister of Muslim justice (who supervised the
sharia courts) , and the minister of religious endowments.
The French-staffed residency services were divided into the
directorates of sharifian affairs, the interior and public
security. In addition the residency had a number of other
regulatory and supervisory agencies: political, economic,
administrative, and military [Ref. 60].
For administrative purposes Morocco, under the French,
was divided into civil regions under appointees of the French
foreign ministry and military regions under military officers
from the French Army. Cities were administered by French
chiefs of municipal services. The pashas and caids, once
powerful members of the makhzan, were now reduced to tax
collectors. Similar procedures were followed in the Spanish
Zone and Tangier s; the other two zones that Morocco had been
divided into just prior to 1912. While a study of the divi-
sion of Morocco into the French, Spanish and Tangier regions
could provide subject matter for a large study in itself, it
will not be undertaken here. It is sufficient to say that
activities in both the Spanish Zone, controlled by the Spanish
high commissioner in Tetouan, and the Tanzier region, controlled
by the consular representatives of the signatory powers of the
Algeciras Conference, mirrored those in the much larger French
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Zone. As such, outside influence had taken away the tradi-
tional authority of the makhzan and made the monarch only a
figurehead. It was this system that continued until Moroccan
independence in 1956.
In February 195 6, to continue the discussions on the
process of decolonization begun earlier, limited home rule
was restored to Morocco in a protocol implementing the
November 6 declaration. Further negotiations for full inde-
pendence culminated in the French-Moroccan agreement signed
in Paris on March 2. As of this date, Morocco again became
an independent state and later that year was admitted to the
United Nations. This agreement abrogated the 1912 Treaty of
Fes, and France would henceforth recognize the independence
and territorial integrity of Morocco. The full exercise of
legislative power was returned to the sultan, and he was also
empowered to create a national army with French assistance.
Further, the French resident general was replaced by a high
commissioner, who two months later became an ambassador.
Interestingly, the author will be attending the Moroccan
Command and Staff College (their highest level military school)
this summer and it is instructed entirely by French officers.
Therefore, the obvious continuing influence of France on the
military of Morocco is evident.
Reunification of the three zones that Morocco had
been divided into, did not occur automatically. There was
some problem with the Spanish recognizing the French action
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but it was more of a political problem between France and
Spain than between Spain and Morocco. Recognition of
Moroccan independence was negotiated separately in Madrid
between the sultan and Generalissimo Franco and made final in
the Joint Declaration of April 1956. This agreement, however,
did not include the Tarfaya area south of the Draa River and
the presidios which were under exclusive Spanish sovereignty,
resulting in an armed Spanish-Moroccan clash over Ifni (a
presidio on the coast) in late 1957. Later though, Spain
agreed to return Tarfaya to Morocco (April 1958) , and Ifni
was finally ceded to Morocco in 1969.
In Tangier, the sultan's sovereignty was restored at
the Conference of Fedala in October 1956 and the international
status of the city was ended. Except for the case of Ifni,
decolonization in Morocco was complete by mid-1958.
B. THE MONARCHY AND INDEPENDENCE: HOW DID IT SURVIVE?
One of the best sources on immediate problems that inde-
pendence posed for the Moroccan monarchy is Lorna Hahn '
s
book, North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood , Washington,
D.C., 1960. In the introduction written by (then) Senator
John F. Kennedy, the importance of the fledgling nation of
Morocco and the rest of North Africa was explicitly implied.
Equally, other authors stressed the growing importance of
Morocco and the rest of North Africa in their works published
just after independence. This book, as well as several others
pertaining to the subject of pressures brought to bear on the
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traditional monarchy as a result of Morocco gaining indepen-
dence is readily available to the interested reader. A
general summation of several of these studies rather than the
emphasis on any one in particular, is the effort of this
portion of the paper.
In his first major speech after his restoration in Novem-
ber 19 55, Mohammed V announced a policy for independent
Morocco predicated on liberty and democracy for his people
and recognition of the country's continued interdependence
with France in terms of its needs for economic and technical
support, while its own citizens were being trained to assume
administrative and technical positions formerly occupied by
the French. The Bekkai government installed in December 1956
included nine members of the most powerful nationalist party,
the Istiqlal; six from the more conservative PDI; and six
non-party independents loyal to the sultan, including Prime
Minister Bekkai himself. According to Ashford, this effort
was little different from that of the protectorate organiza-
tion and "in the early months of independence Morocco con-
tinued to use almost the identical central organization; as it
had previously" [Ref . 61] . This caused the Istiqlal leaders
to resent the sultan's failure to name a clearly predominant
Istiqlal government with a new organization. They felt he
was merely dragging his feet and delaying total independence,
now interpreted by many as independence from the monarchy
itself. But because of the sultan's (now king; Mohammed
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renamed his office this in 1957 as an effort "to symbolize
the intention to introduce a more modern type of government"
[Ref. 62]), great popularity, the Istiglal had to settle for
the role of 'loyal opposition; ' one it has only recently
emerged from.
As stated, Mohammed' general popularity was high. He
enjoyed the unusual position of being a royal figure who was
the hero of an independence struggle. Under him, the sultan's
dual role as head of state and religious leader was strengthened
as it had not been for many centuries. Because he was the
object of popular veneration, he was able to control the
balance of power and parcel out responsibility among the
country's competing institutions, factions and parties, a
trait he bequested to his son and heir, King Hassan II.
This permitted him to consolidate political power in the crown
rather than being dependent upon any particular party includ-
ing the Istiqlal, which in essence, needed him more than he
needed it.
In the months after independence, Mohammed V moved with
deliberation to develop a modern governmental structure under
a constitutional monarchy in which the king would have the
active political role. His aim was to proceed cautiously in
order to avoid problems that changing too fast would pose.
Social and economic reforms were part of his program for
independent Morocco but as will be seen later, these did not
actually materialize until well into the reign of his son,
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Hassan. Mohammed was equally intent on preventing radical
young nationalists from overthrowing him and establishing a
single-party state. Most of these programs were not carried
out, however, due to his untimely death during a minor opera-
tion in February 1961, after which his son Hassan assumed the
monarchy.
In retrospect, the problems confronting the new Mohammed
regime were imposing and caused the monarchy to use every bit
of his influence, status, and inherent diplomatic skills
(which were great according to most) to handle the pressures
they produced. The monarchy was faced with the need to train
people to head the ministries; fill the ranks of the civil
service; assume judicial functions; establish central govern-
ment control over localized and often recalcitrant tribes
and rural localities; and form an independent foreign service,
police force, and national army. These were monumental under-
takings at best and the success of Mohammed and later his
son Hassan in accomplishing all of them in a relatively short
time 1956-1977 (Independence to the final formation of the
Moroccan Parliament) speaks highly of their abilities as
leaders and statesmen.
Other problems were equally evident. Because of the 19 55
treaty with France, the French Army remained at stations in
Morocco in a protection mode under the terms of the treaty.
In response to this the ALN, determined to rid Morocco and
North Africa of French presence in toto, continued to grow
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in strength and also in its irresponsibility, conducting
terrorist campaigns against French forces regularly. After
Mohammed V named his son, Crown Prince Mulay Hassan, as
chief of staff of the new Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armies
Royales—FAR) , the bulk of the ALN gradually incorporated
into the FAR, however, some dissident elements continued
to terrorize along the Algerian border and even supported
the Algeria Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale
—
FLN) [Ref . 63]
.
Another trouble spot for the new Mohammed regime was in
the resistance to the new government by Berber tribes in the .
Rif and Middle Alias and in Tafilalt. With colonial rule
abolished and direct French control gone, ancient internal
quarrels, once again were resumed; a never ending cycle.
However, by 196 0, the Berber uprisings were put down by a
superior Royal army and the central government had success-
fully asserted its control throughout the state [Ref. 64].
Political upheavals in the early stages of the Mohammed
regime also created pressure on the new independent monarchy.
New political parties quickly formed to assert interests not
directly served by the Istiqlal or the other nationalist
parties. The first of these was the Popular Movement
(Movement Populaire—MP) formed originally as a clandestine
group in the Rif mountains among dissident Berber groups, but
by 1959, established as a political party claiming to repre-
sent the Berber rural population against the mainly Arab urban
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nationalist parties. The Istiqlal itself split into radical
and conservative wings and in 1959 the radical wing broke
away from the party, forming a separate political group, the
National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces
Populaires--UNFP) under a second-generation nationalist leader,
Mehdi Ben Barka. All of this caused it to be very difficult
for a workable coalition government to emerge which ultimately
led Mohammed V to assume direct leadership of the government
in 1960 [Ref . 65]
.
In order to assure the people that he was not instituting
a dictatorial regime, Mohammed V promised to promulgate a
written constitution by the end of 1962. Early efforts at
representative government failed, however, largely because
the appointed consultive assembly was given no real authority
by the monarchy to legislate, and the parties had little
experience in parliamentary politics. The monarchy, in spite
of its democratic rhetoric had virtually assured itself the
position as the only viable political force in the country at
that time. Hahn puts it nicely when she writes, "can a coun-
try be truly independent so long as it must depend upon out-
siders to supply most of the manufactured goods which are
virtually essential to life in the twentieth century" [Ref.
66]. Early on, Morocco was dependent economically in almost
total fashion to the French. French weapons supplied the FAR;
French school books supplied the schools; oil and gas from
French-supplied sources ran the vehicles of commerce, military
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and industry. Mohammed's first Five Year Economic Plan aimed
itself directly at improving means of self production and
at finding alternative suppliers of industrial materials.
It was during this time that U .S . -Moroccan relationships began
to grow. However, because the feeling at the time was a
nationalist one, Mohammed V insisted on renegotiating the
1950 treaty under which France had given to the United States
the right to maintain air bases in Morocco for the defense of
Europe. The year 196 3 saw the removal of these bases from
Morocco but not the loss of growing Moroccan-U.S . relations.
The U.S. understood the sentiment in Morocco against the
basing facilities and supported the decisions by the Moroccan
regime on the matter, fully; with probable thoughts of greater
gains that could be realized later.
One problem which Mohammed brought on himself rather
than it being caused by independence, was his approval of the
irredentist claims of the Istiglal party to Mauritania, the
Spanish Sahara as well as parts of Mali and Algeria. In
January 19 61, Mohammed V called a conference in Casablanca of
several of the more radical independent African states of the
period, including Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic
(UAR) and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Repub-
lic in exile. At this conference he negotiated support for
Morocco's claims in Mauritania in return for his backing of
the neutralist and anticolonialist policies of the other
states. The so-called Casablanca Group failed to attain its
goal of close coordination in foreign policy, however, and
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gradually died out. Morocco's stand on Mauritania isolated
the country from most of the newly independent countries of
Africa, most of which had recognized Mauritania when it be-
came independent of France in 1960 [Ref. 67].
Gaining independence from France, in reality, had given
Moroccans and the monarchy more problems than it had while
under colonial rule. Under French control, Moroccan life
was planned, coordinated and controlled. While this in it-
self was distasteful and unacceptable to the imazhigan nature
of Moroccan natives, the problems and pressures associated
with decolonization and independence were even more severe.
It is to Mohammed V's credit, in retrospect, that no other
political force was allowed to rise in authority to a level
above that of the monarch during his relatively short reign.
The monarchy survived independence and its associated pres-
sures through a variety of techniques; some cooperative, but
more often than not, coercive. The point is, that it sur-
vived. A better understanding of the effects that becoming
an independent nation had on the stability of the monarchy
can best be achieved, however, by a closer examination of
the nature of the organization and function of post-independence
Moroccan politics in relationship to their influence on monar-
chial decision making. A closer look at the early years of
Mohammed's successor and son, King Hassan II 's reign and
the multitude of political problems that he encountered is
best suited for this undertaking. This part of the study
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will then be expanded on in the next and concluding portion
of the thesis where the nature of current challenges to the
monarchy in Morocco provides the subject matter.
C. POST-INDEPENDENCE MOROCCAN POLITICS
1. Hassan's Early Problems
Politically, the current monarch of Morocco ran into
opposition from the very beginning. When Mohammed V died
suddenly in February 19 61, some initial doubts were expressed
as to the ability of his son, the thirty-two year old Hassan
II to hold the country together. But, Hassan acted decisively
to assure his people that he would follow the domestic poli-
cies set by his father. In foreign policy, however, Hassan
did not show the same interest in militant neutralism as
had Mohammed V but turned increasingly toward the West.
The new king took personal control of the government
as prime minister and named a new cabinet. He also drew up
his own constitution which gave the monarchy even more author-
ity. Under its provisions the king remained the central
figure in the executive branch of the government, but legisla-
tive power was vested in a two-house parliament, and an
independent judiciary was guaranteed. In 1963 elections to
the parliament were held by universal suffrage, which secured
substantial majorities for the royalist coalitions, the Front
for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions (Front pour
la Defense des Institutions Constitutionelles--FDIC) , formed
that year.
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As 1963 advanced, problems for Hassan's government
began. First, relations between Morocco and Algeria began
to worsen due to a border dispute over the desert region south
of Bechar. In October, Moroccan and Algerian forces fought
a series of small-scale but sharp engagements in the disputed
area. It took the efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia and President Modibo Keita of Mali to arrange a
cease fire. Hassan was unable to do this himself.
In 1963, Hassan opened the first session of the par-
liament but its proceedings were marred by the discovery of a
plot against him allegedly backed by Algeria, in which a
number of radical op-osition leaders were implicated, among
them, Ben Barka [Ref . 68]
.
In 1964, Hassan reorganized the government with Ahmed
Bahnim, head of the Democratic Socialist Party (Parti
Socialiste Democratique—PSD) , as prime minister and a
cabinet drawn mostly from the FDIC group of loyalist parties.
By the mid-1960' s Morocco had established diplomatic
relations with most communist countries and had accepted
military and economic aid from the Soviet Union, thus lending
credence to its official policy of nonalignment . Morocco's
primary political and economic links abroad, however, continued
to be with the West, particularly with France. During a visit
to the United States in 1963, Hassan was reportedly to have
commented, "Because I have relations with the Soviet Union
does not mean I am a Communist, any more than my relations
with France mean I am a Catholic" [Ref. 69].
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Political pressures on the monarchy reasserted them-
selves during the first half of 1965, as students, later
joined by disgruntled unemployed workers (many educated)
rioted in Casablanca. The royal police, reinforced by the
Army, restored order, but at a high cost. Reliable observers
placed the death toll at over 400 people killed.
Also that year, fourteen Moroccans convicted earlier
of gunrunning in connection with the 1963 conspiracy that was
linked to Algeria, were executed as evidence of Hassan's
determination to maintain order. Hassan later told the public
that Morocco's problems were not caused by the Monarchy but
by the bickering political factions that made up the govern-
ment and he promised to form a government of national union.
During the years 1965-1970, political activity in
Morocco ceased after Hassan, making use of his constitutional
prerogative, proclaimed a "state of exception," or national
emergency, assumed full legislative and executive powers.
This was caused by the resignation of Prime Minister Bahnini
in June 1965 due to his decision that he could not hold his
government together. After assuming control, Hassan appointed
a nonparty cabinet— composed of technocrats rather than
politicians, with himself as prime minister— and indicated
that elections would be held at some unspecified future date
after a new constitution had been drawn up. Promised reforms
were shelved, but political disintegration appeared for the
time being, to be arrested.
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During 1966, Moroccan-Algerian relations deteriorated
again as a result of what became known by many as the 'North
Africa arms race.' Alarmed by the mounting flow of Soviet
arms to Algeria, Hassan secured a number of new military
aircraft from the United States. In addition, he visited
Moscow in the fall of 19 66 and the United States in February
1967. New military and economic aid agreements resulted from
both of these visits.
Hassan stepped down as prime minister in 196 7 due to
relaxed tensions and by 19 70 he was able to end the "state
of exception." In July 19 70 he announced that the new consti-
tution had been prepared and it was accepted the next month
by 9 8.7 percent of participating voters. Elections for a
new unicameral legislature followed in August, and the five
year long emergency period was brought to a close.
The next two years were to see the greatest challenges
the Hassan Monarchy has had to face at any time. In 19 71
political opposition members were beginning to uncover and
report evidence of broad corruption and malfeasance in Hassan's
government. They continued to oppose any social or economic
measures that were in progress at that time, no matter how
successful, and stated these programs were either too slow,
corrupt or nonexistent.
On July 10, 19 71, approximately 400 guests were
assembled at Hassan's royal seaside palace at Akhirat, fif-
teen miles southwest of Rabat, to celebrate Hassan's birthday.
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At about 2:00 P.M. the garden party came under attack by
troops employing small arms and grenades. King Hassan
withdrew, unharmed, to the private apartments of the palace
and the premature radio reports issued by the coup leaders,
primarily Colonel Mohammed Ababau, stating that Hassan and
the monarchy were dead, were unfortunately for the rebels,
incorrect
.
About two-and-one-half hours after the attack com-
menced, Hassan reemerged from the royal apartments accompanied
by a sergeant and several young soldiers. The troops present
shouted, "long live Hassan the second!" and the revolt began
its precipitous collapse [Ref. 70]. Three days following the
coup attempt, four generals, five colonels, and a major accused
of leading the conspiracy were executed by firing squad at
the direction of a ministerial war council headed by the king.
On August 16, 19 72, a second military coup on the
monarchy was attempted. As he was returning from a visit to
France, the king's Boeing 72 7 was fired on over Tetouan by
an unscheduled escort of six Moroccan Air Force F-5 jet fighters
led by the commandant of the Kenitra air base. The king's
jet was badly damaged and lost altitude, but it was able to
land. Hassan escaped from the plane before another strafing
run was launched on the grounded plane. Hassan, again unharmed
escaped unharmed, by automobile to Skhirat.
The Minister of Defense, General Oufhir, was impli-
cated as the mastermind of this coup attempt and his connection
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to the earlier attempt was also established. Libyan connec-
tions were also speculated but never proven. Oufhir later
was said to have committed suicide prior to his trial, but
a French reporter counted four bullet holes in his head
when the body was discovered. Other members of the Air Force
who participated in the coup were executed by firing squad
and Hassan rewarded the major who safely piloted his damaged
plane to ground, with the Moroccan Air Force Chief of Staff
job
.
The pressures encountered by the monarchy during
Hassan's early years of rule were enormous. Each one was
handled with much diplomacy and at times firmness; a much
respected trait to the Berber native. Hassan carried on in
the footsteps of his father far better than originally specu-
lated. How he handled political situations in Morocco after
the 1972 coup attempt, which is considered by many to be the
watershed year in the firm establishment of the Moroccan
traditional monarchy, will be taken up in the concluding
part of this thesis. Before this is accomplished, however,
a closer look will be taken at the organization and -function
of the political activities in Morocco that were established
after independence.
2 . Present Function and Organization
Structurally, Morocco is administratively divided
into thirty-five provinces and six urban prefectures. The
provinces are further divided into 72 administrative areas
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and communes. Each administrative region is headed by a
governor, appointed by and directly responsible to the king.
These governors and other leaders are usually relatives of
the monarch. Under the provisions of the third of Morocco's
constitutions produced since Hassan took control in 1961 (and
which he personally wrote) , Morocco is a (Hassan) proclaimed
constitutional and democratic monarchy with Islam as the offi-
cial religion and daily guide for all activities, though its
precepts are not adhered to as rigidly in Morocco as in other
Muslim countries. The constitution provides for equality
before the law and guarantees freedom of movement, speech,
opinion, and assembly. The constitution may be amended by
initiative of the king or the legislature, but the amendment
must be approved by popular referendum.
Article Thirty-Five of the constitution puts the
position of the monarch in its proper perspective. It des-
cribes Hassan as,
Commander of the Faithful, the supreme representative
of the nation, the symbol of its unity, the guarantor
of the existence and continuity of the state. He
watches over respect for Islam and the Constitution. He
is the protection of the rights and liberties of
citizens, social groups, and communities. [Ref. 71]
Other powers and authority of the monarchy are exten-
sive. He is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. He
appoints all important officials, promulgates legislation
passed by the legislature, and signs and ratifies treaties.
He presides over the Cabinet, the Council for National
Development and Planning, and the Supreme Judicial Council,
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and possesses the power to dissolve the legislature and rule
by decree by declaring a state of emergency as he did in 1965.
The 1972 constitution calls for a unicameral House of
Representatives elected for a four year term. The king may
request the legislature to reconsider legislation before
giving his assent. He may also dissolve the House by decree.
The judicial system is headed by a supreme court that
consists of four chambers (civil, criminal, administrative
and social) , all headed by judges appointed by the King.
To say that Hassan has his finger in all the political pies
in the country would certainly be an understatement. He is
the politics of the country.
On the other side of the political fence resides the
lesser important factionally split Moroccan parliament, headed
by a Prime Minister who is appointed by the King (and his
cousin also) to watch over their activities. Its composition
presently includes the following political parties; the
Istiqlal, Popular Movement (MP), Socialist Union of Popular
Forces (USFP) , Constitutional and Democratic Popular Move-
ment (MPCD) , National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) , National
Group of Independents (RNI) , Party of Progress and Socialism
(PPS--Communist) , and the Democratic Independents (ID)
.
These members all work off a central government budget of
about seven billion (U.S.) dollars. Defense spending accounts
for about 40 percent of the central budget.
The RNI is the most powerful group with 84 of the
264 parliamentary seats and was founded in 19 77 by former
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Prime Minister Ahmed Osman. And in 19 81 when Hassan named a
new cabinet, the RNI became the designated opposition (loyal
opposition) party in the parliament. A splinter group of the
RNI, the Democratic Independents (ID) , is the second most
powerful with 57 seats.
The Istiqlal Party which led the country to indepen-
dence, is the third largest political group in parliament
with 53 seats. The party's strength is primarily urban, and
Fes and Meknes are its traditional strongholds
.
Fourth on the list of most powerful parties is the
popular movement (MP) which is based primarily on rural
Berber support. It has 41 seats in parliament and holds five
cabinet positions.
The fifth most powerful group is the Socialist Union
of Popular Forces (USFP) which emerged in 19 74 after a split
from the original major left-of-center party, the National
Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) . It holds 13 seats in the
parliament and is very popular with Moroccan youths and
intellectuals
.
Sixth is the Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS)
and it is the latest label for the small Moroccan Communist
Party. Though currently tolerated, it has at various times
been officially illegal; most recently from 1969 to late 1974.
It appeals to the younger, disaffected elements of society.
It has one seat in parliament.
Seventh is the National Union of Popular Forces
(UNFP) which rose out of a schism between radical and
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conservative wings of the Istiqlal in 1959 and is the third
oldest political party in Morocco behind the Istiqlal and
the MP. It is a relatively weak organization currently,
beset by internal strife and it holds no seats in the current
parliament as it chose not to participate in the last election,
The final group, the Constitutional and Democratic
Popular Movement, a small faction of the MP, has one seat in
the parliament. The parliament currently has fourteen un-
attended seats [Ref. 72].
Any ratings on strengths of individual parties in the
parliament are relative only to that body and not to their
actual impact on the monarchy or their influence on the
Moroccan society as a whole. However, in the parliament it-
self, the members constitute one brach of the political elite
of the country. The other branch, of course, being the
monarchy itself. Among the parliamentary elite, fierce
competition takes place for power, but more importantly,
for patronage. None, however, come near to achieving the
patronage that Hassan controls.
The diverseness of the parliament as well as of
Moroccan society as a whole has allowed Hassan (and his
father) before him, to capitalize on this situation by acting
in the politically rewarding role of arbiter between conflict-
ing groups with great success. This is hauntingly character-
istic of the role Berber chieftans portrayed in the rise of
the three great Berber dynasties which were discussed in the
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first section of this study. On the one hand, the monarch
recognizes and encourages the allegiance shown him by various
parties, and on the other, develops ways of strengthening his
own support at the expense of the very same parties. If
the parties became too strong, Hassan has the ability to
weaken them through his dismissal and appointment preroga-
tive. He would never destroy one completely, however. By
way of balancing popular support and his ability to play the
King's majority membership of Parliament against rival power
seeking organizations, Hassan is able to maintain a strategy
of intergroup rivalry. In this manner he can claim the role
of power broker and utilize the throne as the symbol of
political continuity among discontinuous political leadership.
The king's power and prestige are further enhanced
by the fact that he is the prime dispenser of patronage and
the ultimate source of spoils in the system. His control of
the patronage system and command of the Moroccan economic
system are his most effective tools of elite control.
The king's position is further protected by his own
ruling apparatus which consists of an executive staff, the
intelligence and security branches of the Ministry of the
Interior and the Ministry of National Defense, and a basically
loyal army and officer corps of which he is the Chief of
Staff. These personnel, in addition to the countless family
members and close personal friends, he has at all levels of
government, assist in the maintenance of royal authority.
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In conclusion, the monarchy's position relative to
other political forces in Morocco is clear. It is by far the
dominant institution of the Moroccan society, drawing its
legitimacy from another dominant force, Islam. The monarchy's
personal charisma is another source of legitimacy for the
monarchy. By surviving the political turmoil that marked
Moroccan Politics immediately following independence, both
Hassan and his father, Mohammed, came to be respected by
friends and foe alike.
Hassan's greatest source of popular support has come,
however, from a contemporary monarchial action; that involv-
ing the Western Sahara, and this will be discussed in the
last portion of the study.
The eight political parties that make up the Moroccan
Parliament do not possess much in the way of structural
legitimacy but they do provide an effective instrument of
control for the monarch. Through the parliament, the king
can control the country without being openly perceived as
doing so. To the uneducated Moroccan mass (about 75-80%),
the parliament is a symbol of free government and a modern
state. In actuality it is far from it.
The problem of modernization will continue to be the
most dangerous to the monarchy. While this one point could
provide endless conjecture for analysis, Hassan has in short,
done two things to confront this dilemma. He has adapted
his policies to both short and long-term tactics. In the
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short-term he has avoided the problem by focusing on popular
issues. The promulgation of constitutions, implementation
of nationalization and land redistribution, and the expansion
into the Western Sahara have won muchpopular support for the
monarchy. Long-range strategies are more complicated and
are aimed at the continuance of the monarchy itself. Hassan
has apparently chosen to preserve the traditional monarchy
by minimizing the disruptive effects on it that modernization
will bring. This is the third recourse that Huntington gives
to the modernizing autocrat mentioned earlier in the study.
In this attempt, the massive foreign borrowing of money to
help alleviate poor social and economic conditions that the
monarch has currently undertaken could be seen as the
monarch's effort to eliminate future problems before they
occur.
The nature of current political and socio-economic
pressures on the monarchy in Morocco is the subject matter
for the next and final portion of the study. A conclusion
will then be drawn on the overall effects that these pressures
have had on the institution of the monarchy.
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IV. THE CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE MONARCHY
By the early 19 80 's, the Moroccan monarchy had attained
a high degree of relative stability. Two factors account
for this situation. First, Hassan has been able to use the
monarchy's religious prestige and patrongage powers to balance
quasi-feudalistic interests and keep potential societal
challenges in check. This is most evident in Hassan's manipu-
lation of the monarchy's greatest potential rival for politi-
cal preeminence and control, the eight party Moroccan parliament.
Aside from Hassan's personal political skills, the main reason
the modern political sector, i.e., the multi-party, parlia-
mentary system—has not faired better in its competition
with the traditional monarchy for power and authority, is
its inability to achieve a high level of institutionalization.
By the standard outlined above, the parliament is not a developed
institution. Its most serious flaw is the deep divisions
which exist between its members. In contrast, the institu-
tional base of the Moroccan monarchy is quite well developed.
The second reason for the stability of the Moroccan monarchy
is its ability to maintain its popular base. Many theorists
argue that traditional monarchs are, by their very nature,
prone to stagnation and instability [Ref. 74]. However,
these arguments usually assume that the traditional monarch
views modernization as a threat to his power and authority
and that, consequently, he will seek to retard social, economic,
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and political advances. In Morocco however, Hassan appears
to regard modernization as a reality that cannot be halted.
Instead of fighting this process, he has sought to control
and manage it. In this respect he has adopted the course
proposed by Huntington [Ref. 75].
This section examines the major domestic and diplomatic
challenges facing the monarchy today. While this is usually
accomplished through an examination of separate social,
political and economic situations in a country, in the case
of Morocco they are not easily separated. In this study,
they will be considered as interrelated factors, contributing
as a whole to the disruptive nature of the society. The
development of social unrest as a result of the emergence of
an increasingly educated, urbanizing mass has already been
elaborated on in the section on modernization. As a result
of recent economic and social reforms instituted by Hassan,
mass discontent is relatively minimal. In fact, the last
major incident of social unrest occurred in 19 81 when Morocco's
restive young population rioted in Casablanca. The riots were
quelled after Moroccan security forces—on orders from the
monarchy— killed about 500 of the rioters [Ref. 76]. Although
the proximate cause of these riots was protest over reduced
food subsidies, the real problem was much deeper. Food subsi-
dies had reduced on orders from the International Monetary
Fund as part of an overall economic austerity measure imple-
mented by the monarch.
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Social unrest due to economic and other related problems
is present but currently, it does not pose as large a threat
to the stability of the monarchy as do two other more greatly
proportional problems. The first is the domestic challenge,
growing out of steadily worsening economic conditions which
not only gives rise to social unrest but more importantly,
limits the country's overall development. The second problem
is the diplomatic cum domestic challenge presented by the
Western Sahara issue. By examining Hassan's handling of
these two problem areas, I hope to be able to offer some
conclusions concerning the prospects for the continued
stability of the monarchy.
A. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
The Hassan monarchy currently faces two critical domestic
economic challenges. The first is rising unemployment and
the second is the failing national economy of the country.
These problems as well as the monarchy's responses to them is
the focus of this section of the study.
1. The Unemployment Challenge
In all countries, unemployment almost inevitably
gives rise to social and political discord. Especially if
they are educated, out-of-work, hungry, and idle people,
it creates a potentially explosive situation that, if not
successfully checked, can ultimately threaten the state's
power and authority.
Unemployment figures for Morocco since 19 56 are
sporadic at best. According to the London-based Economist
,
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best estimates are that unemployment in Morocco at indepen-
dence was 9 percent and rose gradually through 19 82 to as high
as 25 percent in the major urban sectors, primarily Casablanca.
The reasons for this are numerous but most are related to
those aspects of social mobilization— e.g., education
and urbanization discussed above.
Social mobilization and urbanization created employ-
ment problems at both ends of the economic spectrum. Morocco's
economy remains an agrarian one with at least 45 percent of
the GDP coming form this sector. However, the advent of
social mobilization caused by increased education which led
to the urbanization of the country has caused a movement of a
majority of the country's qualified agricultural workers to
move to the city. This has left the agricultural sector
dependent upon unqualified workers for its operation. This
is significant, again, when one considers that agricultur re-
mains the chief source of revenue for the country. By 19 82
the lack of qualified agricultural workers in Morocco's
primary economic sector caused an abundance of problems.
The Economist stated that rural areas—those most affected
by a lack of qualified workers—at times suffered more from
underemployment than from unemployment. This, according to
the source, was evident when "at harvest time there were
actually local labor shortages, and farmers who had planted
late-maturing crops, frequently migrated to areas of early-
maturing crops to take advantage of temporarily high wages.
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At harvest time it was possible for daily wages to jump to
four or five times the normal rural wage rate" [Ref . 77]
.
Likewise, the move from rural to urban centers caused
unemployment problems in the cities. According to one source,
Morocco's demographic structure has changed significantly.
The urban component of the population rose from 14 percent
in 1956 to 46 percent by 19 82 with Casablanca alone accounting
for 3.2 million of Morocco's 20 million inhabitants [Ref. 78].
As farmers moved to the cities, shantytowns ("medinas")
,
sprang up, providing a breeding ground for discontent. Rural
peasants lacked the skills necessary for jobs in the indus-
trial sector which were scarce to begin with. These circum-
stances and others have caused significant problems that the
monarchy has had to face
.
In regard to unemployment in the country since 1956,
two main problems have emerged. The first is the unemploy-
ment in the rural farming sectors caused more from a shortage
of qualified farm hands than from actual numbers of people
available to work. This is significant due to the majority
role that agriculture plays in the economy of the country.
The second problem is the unemployment in the urbaniz-
ing sectors caused by its inability to absorb unskilled mi-
grants from the rural areas. Educated Moroccans have an aver-
sion to manual labor and the migrants do not have the skills
to perform industrial tasks. True unemployment rather than
underemployment is the situation in the industrial areas.
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In order to combat the shortage of trained and experi-
enced Moroccan management and administrative personnel, the
monarchy created in 19 76 a center for the study of human re-
sources in order to ascertain the full extent of the coun-
try's technical and scientific talent. A one percent tax
on sales was paid by manufacturers to help support vocational
training centers, though some of the better employees emi-
grated to Western Europe after they had acquired sufficient
skills. In certain areas, however, the government continues
to rely, by necessity, on foreign technicians, particularly
French citizens. The official policy of replacing foreigners
with Moroccans (or "Moroccanization" as Hassan terms it)
has been implemented cautiously despite pressure from politi-
cal opposition and trade union groups. By 19 82 an estimated
9,000 French technicians and teachers were still employed in
Morocco.
Other recent domestic problems, namely the Casblanca
riots of 19 81, has caused the monarchy to speed up its
efforts at curbing the urban unemployed. Due to that dis-
turbance, Hassan promised a complete review of the country's
domestic economic problems, primarily unemployment, and
already by 19 82, government authorities have taken steps in
order to help alleviate the misery of the urban unemployed.
An additional Dh 200 mn (5.5 Dirham--Dh = $1 U.S.) has been
added to its Dh 1.3 bn job creation scheme (part of Hassan's
current 5 year economic plan to be discussed later) which
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aims to establish workshops to employ between 400,000 and
450,000 people [Ref. 79].
In the rural sector the king has also called for
studies concerning the development of several rural towns,
each housing 30,000-50,000 people, to try to stem the tide of
rural depopulation. Hopefully, by stepping up the pace of
rural development while at the same time increasing food
production from the agricultural sector, the rural agricul-
tural sector, which remains the lifeblood of the Moroccan
economy, can cease its downward spiral and become productive
once again [Ref. 80].
According to the economic journal, Meed , Morocco's
first attempt at resettlement into a rural area will occur
sometime this year or early 19 84, with the movement from the
North of almost 100,000 rural dwellers, to a new settlement
across the bay from Dakhla in the Western Sahara region.
According to the source, the designs for the new town were
completed in mid- 19 82 by Venezuelan architect, Jose Miguel
Menedez. The development when completed would, like Dakhla,
be based on fishing and agriculture. It is also intented
to be energy self-sufficient, using wind and solar power.
Cost of the project is estimated at $1,720 million U.S. over
a 15 year period [Ref. 81]. Speculation over Morocco's
future plans for the Western Sahara region should certainly
take into consideration these resettlement possibilities.
In regard to overall unemployment, the Hassan admin-
istration hopes to create almost a million jobs over the
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19 81-1985 five year period and this is a large part of his
current five year plan. During this period, the GDP is ex-
pected to average a yearly growth rate of 6.5 percent a year.
When combined with an 8 percent growth in investment, the
improvement in the rate of consumption should reach 5.7
percent and create over 950,000 jobs.
Hassan is accused by many of his opponents
—
primarily
the loyal opposition members of the Moroccan Parliament, the
RNI—of attempting to divert attention away from the monarchy's
inability to handle the economic situation by focusing on the
Western Sahara and a "greater Morocco," as the Hassan regime
terms the movement. In doing this, his critics say, Hassan
is attempting to unite the country behind a very popular cause
rather than deal directly with the economic problems
—
pri-
marily unemployment—that divide the country.
Unemployment remains a challenge to the Hassan
monarchy, but in difference to those prognosticators mentioned
earlier, who would accuse the monarchy of skirting the issue
by dwelling on the Western Sahara campaign, King Hassan and
his government appear to be attacking the problem head on,
evidenced by the reform measures just listed. Only time will
tell if he has been successful or not.
2 . The Failing National Economy
Unemployment is only one aspect of the overall
economic challenge that currently confronts the monarchy.
This portion of the study looks at some of the other economic
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problem areas that Hassan faces today; as well as his
responses in dealing with these challenges.
In 19 81, Hassan proposed a new five year economic
plan to curb rapidly deteriorating economic conditions of
which unemployment was a large but not the singular contribut-
ing factor. The idea of five year plans was begun in 19 56
by Mohammed V. Originally the current plan called for a
total investment of $21.4 billion U.S. in these major areas
of concentration:
— Defense and related expenditures to consolidate
Morocco's position in the Western Sahara;
— Improved productivity in dryland farming areas;
— Development of the fisheries industry as well as the
energy and tourism sectors;
— Reducing socioeconomic disparities by creating 950,000
new jobs through labor-intensive projects and by ex-
panding facilities such as hospitals, rural schools, and
housing; and
— Economic decentralization and regional development by
providing intestment incentives for industries that
locate away from the Coastal Casabalnca-Kenitra axis to
rural and inland areas and by channeling government
resources to local authorities for regional development
priorities [Ref. 82].
In addition to the above, the government plan had
hoped that tax reforms and a new investment code would
stimulate private and foreign investment, which together
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would have provided two-thirds of the plan's financing. Among
the major projects envisioned by the plan were:
— A 970-kilometer (582 mile) railroad from Marrakech to
El Ayoune in the Western Sahara expected to cost $2
billion U.S. toward the end of the decade;
— Increasing phosphate rock production from 20.7 million
metric tons (MT) in 19 80 to 27 million in 19 85;
— Construction of three more phosphoric acid plants and
adding sulfuric acid to plant capacity;
— Development of small-scale mining-cobalt, coal, silver,
lead, and copper;
-- A new fishing port at Dakhla in the Western Sahara and
expansion of fishing port areas at Agadir and Tan Tan;
— Three large sugar refineries;
— Development of nuclear energy and oil shale resources;
and
— Construction of 25 new industrial parks away from the
Casablanca-Kenitra areas. [Ref. 83]
From the onset, Hassan's planners understood that
without sizable foreign and domestic capital investments,
financing for the new plan would fall short of requirements
.
A new investment code was implemented permitting 10 percent
foreign participation in various sectors, and government price
controls and import restrictions were relaxed and other
government measures were taken to give the investment easier
access to credit.
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However, by mid-19 83, a Meed study indicated that the
plan was stalled in many areas due to world and domestic
economic conditions that had direct impact on the new plan.
First, there was a drastic fall, within a few months, in the
price of raw phosphate rock to about $30-32 U.S. a ton, down
from $40 U.S. a ton, because of world oversupply. Second,
exports fell in value by 10 percent in 19 82 to MD 3,445
million ($500 millionU.S.) —more than one-quarter of total
exports. Third, a disastrous drought in 19 81 in the South
destroyed half the cereal crop and led to the premature
slaughter of one-third of the national herd of sheep, goats
and cattle. Finally, a 11 percent rise in the dollar against
the dirham between end-December 19 82 and end-June 19 83 has
increased the cost of oil imports [Ref. 84].
When the above problems are connected with the enormous
cost of financing the war in the Western Sahara (by some esti-
mates $5-6 million monthly) , the economic challenges facing
Hassan appear insurmountable.
In response to these economic problems the Hassan
administration has begun to tighten its belt and reconsider
many of the original goals mapped out in the 19 81-19 85 economic
plan. While it has not shelved the original plans, many
programs that have not attracted foreign investment have been
put on the back burner. These have included the plans to
build the three sugar refineries, energy projects involving
hydroelectric dams, and the construction of several planned
industrial parks away from the Casablanca-Kenitra area.
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The World Bank has been advising Morocco's financial
authority since 19 80, and in fact made the recommendation on
import subsidies that led to the Casablanca riots in 19 81.
However, IMF predictions of a worsening economic crisis were
not taken seriously until mid-19 83. At that time, rigorous
import controls were introduced, several major projects were
shelved (mentioned) and the budget was revised downward.
The budget revision was generally seen as a preparation for
IMF assistance, now being negotiated. In addition, overseas
borrowing which had reached a high point in 19 82 with the
approval of over $50 million U.S. in military sales credits
by the United States to Morocco, largely used to support the
war in the Western Sahara, was reduced [Ref. 85].
Despite the substantial economic problems facing the
country, according to the IMF, Morocco's return to the commer-
cial market in the foreseeable future is not ruled out.
Hassan has seen the need for an economic change-in-habit and
has acted accordingly, thus stopping a downward spiral that
ultimately would have spelled Morocco's financial doom.
Additionally, the need to refer budget cuts to the
king underlines the political sensitivity of the government's
decision. As the central decision maker in the country,
Hassan is recognized by the parliament as being the only one
that could sell budget cuts to the public. His personal
charisma and religious status make this unpleasant task far
easier for him to accomplish than for the fractionalized
parliament to do so. However, in keeping with his program
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of governing without appearing to govern, the king has re-
ferred approval of the budget cuts to a specifically convened
session of the parliament in response to their calls for
debate on such sweeping cuts. Hassan's prior approval of
the cuts, however, makes the job easy for the parliament and
their 'approval' is only a matter of conjecture so far as
the significance of their endorsement is concerned [Ref. 86].
Economically, Morocco is in a bad situation. But
Hassan appears to have taken control of the problem. By
cooperating with the IMF, Morocco has a good chance of economic
recovery in the near future. Budget cuts appear to be the
only solution, and the only political force in the country
capable of selling this news to an already overburdened people
is the monarchy. In the next section, the Western Sahara
issue, which is the major challenge facing the monarch today,
will be discussed. This will then be followed by a summation
of the study.
B. DIPLOMATIC UNREST—THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE
According to John Damis, "there is little question that
the leading regional issue in North Africa since 19 75 has
been the ongoing conflict over the decolonization and final
disposition of the Western Sahara" [Ref. 87]. Other analysts
tend to agree with Damis and the general contention among all
of them is that if there were no Western Sahara dispute,
relations between the states in the North African Maghrab
would be much improved. Of the major states in the area--Morocco
,
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Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and Libya--only Tunisia has
stayed out of the conflict.
The Western Sahara comprises 267,027.8 square kilometers
(102,703 sq. mi.) of wasteland—an area about the size of
Colorado [Ref. 88]. Since 1975 it has been the focus of
intense military and diplomatic activity, involving a wide
variety of actors, the most important of which are Morocco
and Algeria. Mauritania occupied the southern third of the
region in late 19 75 and fought with limited success against
the Polisario forces (the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro, the northern and southern
portions of the region) until July 19 78, when a military coup
overthrew the civilian government of Mauritania and led to
a ceasefire. In August 1979, Mauritania signed a peace treaty
with the Polisario front and withdrew from the war. Libya
has given important military and financial backing to the
Polisario.
The actual combatants in the struggle are Morocco, Algeria
and the Polisario front itself. In Damis's view, the Western
Saharan conflict has three dimensions. First, and beyond
the issues of Saharan decolonization and self-determination,
the conflict "is part of a broader set of problems between
Morocco and Algeria that is not limited to the regimes now
in power in Rabat and Algiers" [Ref. 89]. He contends that a
settlement of the Saharan issue would not change the basic
animosity, deriving from ideological differences, that exists
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between the two states. Second, Polisario depends on this
existing animosity between Algeria and Morocco for legitimi-
zation of its long term nationalist goal of an independent
Saharan state. Finally, Damis argues that outside powers
have only marginal influence or interest in the Western
Sahara conflict. He states that "neither the United States
nor the Soviet Union has anything to gain from a continuing
or escalation of the military struggle in Northwest Africa"
[Ref . 90]
.
From Damis 's standpoint then, the Western Sahara issue
is regional in nature and not, as some others have postulated,
an extension of the East-West conflict. Statements by Hassan
that the large numbers of soviet weapons Moroccan forces are
encountering in the war with the Polisario proves they are
fighting the Soviet Union are, according to Damis, simply
another example of Hassan's efforts to manipulate outside
actors to get additional arms. In that respect, they are
a diplomatic analogue to his skill at balancing and juggling
pressures from potential domestic rivals.
Although the Western Saharan conflict does appear to be
only a regional dispute at present, it has the potential to
become an international dispute. Already, it has contributed
significantly to divisions in the OAU.
1 . The Background of the Saharan Issue
The origins of the Saharan dispute can be traced back
as far as 1886 when Hassan I, the namesake of the current
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monarch, seized control of the region from Spain. Before
then, tribes in the region had looked to the sultan as their
spiritual guide and offered their political allegiance to him
whenever he sent emissaries to the region to collect material
tributes. However, the onset of colonial domination in
Morocco by France ended the relationship between Morocco and
its Western Saharan ally as it also. ended the glory and
strength of the monarchy itself [Ref. 91].
After World War II, the colonial situation in Morocco
began to change. As discussed above, at that time various
nationalist groups led by Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef V
began to contest Spanish and, more predominantly, French
dominion. Because of his role in the activites of the
nationalists, Mohammed V was deposed by his French "protec-
tors" on August 20, 19 53, and forced into exile in Madagascar,
This action resulted in a true nationalist uprising that ulti-
mately led France--hard pressed by the revolutionary struggle
for independence in neighboring Algeria--to bring Mohammed
back to Morocco and return him to his throne. Later on
March 2, 1956, independence was granted to Morocco [Ref. 92].
At independence the new government in Rabat decided
to reunify the old Sherifien Empire. This meant reclaiming
'lost 1 territories. The initial stage of this campaign in-
cluded pressure on the international community to end all
protectorate agreements. In 1957, the Spanish relinquished
their control over northern Morocco (the Rif Mountain region)
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and over the southern zone bordering on the Sahara [Ref.
93] .
The Western Saharan conflict is frequently referred
to as "Hassan's war." This characterization is an oversim-
plification as it ignores the fact that Morocco's war effort
has broad-based national support. One of the sources of
Hassan's legitimacy—both secular and spiritual— is his role
as defender of Morocco's territorial integrity. For this
reason, restoring a portion of the national patrimony, the
annexation of the Western Sahara enhanced the King's legiti-
macy [Ref. 94]. However, Hassan did not actually start the
war. The Moroccan claim to the Western Sahara was first
raised seriously not by the monarchy but by the Istiqlal
Party at the time of independence in 19 56 and was championed
by party leader, Allal Al-Fassi, who later died in 1974.
This claim formed part of a larger irredentist claim to a
"greater Morocco" which also included Mauritania, western
Algeria, and a northern portion of Mali. Not until 1958 did
the monarchy, under Mohammed V, join in the call for annexa-
tion; even then it was more for political gain than actual
interest in fulfilling any "greater Morocco" dream. Many
scholars have argued that at that time, the monarchy was
merely one of several competing forces within the country.
By choosing to champion the Saharan claim, which was then
regarded as a popular cause, the monarchy prevented the
Istiqlal Party from using the issue to outflank the monarchy
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and bolster its claim to be the leading force of Moroccan
nationalism [Ref. 95].
By the early 1960's it was evident that Morocco's his-
torical claims were a source of potentially serious disagree-
ments with its neighbors. The 1963 discovery of large phosphate
reserves in the Saharan territory renewed interest in the
area. In addition to Morocco, Spain, Mauritania and Algeria
began to show increasing concern about the territory's future.
So long as the issue was seen as one of decolonization, the
three African states presented a common front in their demands
for Spanish evacuation. However, their plans for the post-
colonial Saharan territory differed. Morocco wanted to annex
the territory. Mauritania also had historical claims to
parts of the territory but it supported self-determination
for the area into the early 1970 's, perhaps hoping the terri-
tory might form a buffer between it and Morocco. Algeria made
no territorial claims for itself, but did not want the area's
mineral deposits to come under Moroccan control. For that
reason, it consistently supported self-determination for the
Saharan people [Ref. 96].
During the 1960's, the UN passed several resolutions
calling for self-determination for the Sahara area. By 19 73,
a number of guerrilla organizations were operating in the
territory, some supporting independence and others favoring
associations with one or another of the involved sovereign
states. The Polisario became the dominant guerrilla force.
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It advocated Sharan independence and was strongly backed by
Algeria. According to Damis, the composition of Polisario
is not clear but it includes a combination of a "genuine
core of Sahrawi Nationalists (some of whom spent time in
Morocco or Mauritania) , highly dedicated and committed to a
long and difficult struggle for an independent Saharan state,
some Algerian mercenaries, and other young Moroccan and
Mauritanian dissidents" [Ref. 97].
By the summer of 1974 mounting pressures on Spain to
end its rule in the Sahara caused it to announce that it
would hold a referendum under UN auspices to decide the future
of the territory. In May 19 75, however, Spain changed its
position and decided to withdraw from the Saharan territory
as soon as possible. The withdrawal process was hastened on
6 November of that year when 350,000 unarmed Moroccan citizens
engaged in the "Green March," Into the Western Sahara with
the design of intimidating Spanish authorities [Ref. 98].
According to Damis, the term "Green March" had special
connotations for Moroccan citizens. Green was closely asso-
ciated with the Prophet Mohammed, and according to Islam, is
the color of peace. In addition, the number of marchers,
350,000, was selected because it represented the annual num-
ber of births in Morocco [Ref. 99].
After the march, on 15 November 19 75, Spain agreed to
withdraw from the Sahara and ceded its former territory to
Morocco and Mauritania in a tripartite agreement insisting,
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however, that the Saharan population should have the right
of self-determination. With the final withdrawal of Spanish
troops in February 1976, Hassan's forces entered the terri-
tory, as did those of Ould Daddah , the President of Mauritania
at that time. Mauritanian occupation was immediately contested
by the Polisario, which,, relying on classic hit-and-run
guerrilla tactics, kept the Moroccans and Mauritanians off
balance while the majority of the native Saharan population
fled to Algeria and established refugee camps. From these
camps came the main recruits and reinforcements for the
Polisario 's war effort. During 1978-1979, Polisario forces
proved to be a formidable foe for the Moroccan Army. Morocco
was forced to increase the size of its Saharan Army to nearly
50,000 soldiers. The Polisario countered this buildup by
sending raiding parties deep into southern Morocco, raising
the political and economic costs to the country [Ref. 100].
In 19 78, the most dramatic consequence of the war
was the withdrawal of Mauritania from the southern third of
Spanish Sahara. The growing success of Polisario in Mauri-
tania, including their capacity to virtually paralyze that
nation's economic sector, led to the overthrow of the Daddah
regime that same year. Subsequently, on 5 August 1979, Mauri-
tania signed a peace initiative with the Polisario at Algiers
and renounced its territorial claims and withdrew all its
occupation forces. This left only Morocco to carry on the
war.
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The next portion of the study will examine Morocco's
activities in the Western Sahara region since the withdrawal
of Mauritania in 19 79. Special attention will be focussed
on the pressures that this long, protracted war has placed on
the institutional stability of the monarchy, and Hassan's
responses to those pressures.
2 . The Saharan Issue--A Major Source of Current
Problems for the Monarchy
Following the withdrawal of Mauritania from the Sahara
in 19 79, the Moroccan government came under increasing pres-
sure to continue the struggle alone. Members of the parlia-
ment and the higher ranks of the military pushed for the use
of greater force to bring the long and costly war to an end.
However, this idea was rejected by Hassan. He feared that
such an action would increase international opposition to the
Moroccan cause. Most foreign leaders saw the Moroccan effort
as an act of colonization that disregarded the Saharan
peoples' right of self-determination, as mandated earlier by
the UN. As an alternative to military escalation, Hassan
instituted a war of defense in 19 80-19 81. Major fortifica-
tions, in the form of rock walls, were built around the major
economic and population centers in the territory including
the phosphate mine at Bu Crasa . The war of conquest had
turned into one of hanging-on.
Hassan found his diplomatic position increasingly
isolated and vulnerable in the Third World. After the
formation of a self-proclaimed Saharoui Democratic Arab
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Republic (SADR) by Polisario in 19 80, 26 OAU member states
proposed to extend recognition to SADR representatives at
OAU meetings. When these states endorsed the SADR for full
membership, Morocco threatened to withdraw from the OAU. This
threat was repeated when it was announced that the Algerian
and Libyan Governments were planning to make another deter-
mined effort to obtain recognition for the SADR at the 19 81
OAU summit in Nairobi. Hassan warned that "if the OAU did
so this time, and infringed the fundamental principles upon
which it is based, it would break the organization up and a
number of other member countries would follow Morocco in
leaving the OAU" [Ref. 101].
At the same time, the domestic impact of the war was
beginning to pose an even bigger threat to the Hassan regime.
Support for the Saharan campaign which had reached its zenith
at the time of the Green March in 19 75 was now faltering
badly. Moroccans had not counted on a long and costly war
that would increasingly isolate Morocco diplomatically. In
addition, the war began to have a negative effect on the
Moroccan economy, which had continued to stagnate despite
Saudi infusions of funds. Damis contends that the direct
impact on Moroccan society of the military and administrative
expenses in conducting the war was initially cushioned by
generous financial aid from Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser
extent, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Erairites—conserva-
tive Arab monarchies that did not want to see socialist
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Algeria increase its influence. From 1975 on, according to
Damis, Saudi aid mounted to between $500 million U.S. and $1
billion U.S. dollars a year. It is generally believed that
Morocco's economic problems in 19 80-81 were primarily the
result of depressed world phosphate prices, a severe drought,
and underlying structural problems in the economy [Ref. 102].
The IMF summary of Morocco's economic problems discussed
earlier, would seem to support this contention. However, the
fact remains that at the time the Moroccan populace believed
the Saharan campaign was a major cause of the country's
economic problems and, in believing such, pressured the
monarchy to bring the Saharan conflict to an early conclusion.
In response the combination of growing socio-economic
pressures at home and diplomatic problems with neighboring
states, Hassan adopted a new fact. His decision to appear
personally at the OAU summit meeting in June 19 81 led to wide-
spread speculation that he intended to present the assembled
heads of state with a hardline position. Instead, Hassan
disarmed most of his critics by proposing a "controlled
referendum" on the future of the Western Sahara. Caught off-
balance by this announcement, the Polisario leadership
charged the monarch with suggesting a "pernicious formula."
But Algeria's president, Cahdli Bendjedid, welcomed the
Moroccan proposal as a "step forward toward peace" [Ref. 103]
.
After some debate, the OAU endorsed a resolution that
established an Implementation Committee to work out modalities
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for the referendum. The committee consisted of nine African
states, including Sudan, Tanzania, Mali, Guinea, Nigeria,
Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria. In the interim,
the OAU resolution asked all parties in the dispute to ob-
serve an immediate ceasefire and asked the United Nations
to provide a peacekeeping force and assist in the conduct of
a "fair and free" referendum [Ref. 104].
After reviewing Hassan's proposal, the Polisario pub-
lished a list of its own demands which included, but were not
limited to, the complete withdrawal of Moroccan forces from
the Western Sahara. Meeting in Nairobi late in August, the
OAU Implementation Committee attempted to meet some of the
Polisario' s demands but was unable to agree on offices in the
region. Nor were all in agreement on the necessity for
Morocco's complete withdrawal from an area to that which some
members of the committee felt Morocco held legitimate claims.
The result of the failure of the OAU to bring about
the referendum and a ceasefire led to continued fighting in
the region during the remainder of 19 81. By 19 82 the Sahara
issue had engulfed the OAU itself in one of the gravest
crises since its founding in 1963.
In late February 19 82, the SADR was officially admitted
to an OAU meeting for the first time. This prompted a walk-out
by the Moroccan delegation. By 24 February the number of
delegates joining Morocco in the walk-out grew to seventeen
[Ref. 105]. By April 1982, the OAU was at a virtual standstill,
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The OAU ' s Implementation Committee met in an attempt to end
the impasse. President Daniel Arap Moi , of Kenya, the OAU
Chairman, opened the meeting by stating that the SADR issue
was "the most serious challenge yet to the survival of the
19-year-old organization" [Ref. 106]. The meeting ended on
24 April with the deadlock over the Sahara issue still in
effect [Ref. 107]. The general agreement which later came to
be accepted (through default and the lack of a better one)
,
was Polisario's and Algeria's joint position which reasoned
that since the SADR had become a full member of the OAU,
bilateral negotiations between the Polisario and Morocco was
the obvious next step. In the Polisario's view, no further
special OAU meetings to deal with the Sahara issue were
necessary. This decision effectively ruled out further
cooperation with the OAU Implementation Committee [Ref. 10 8].
On 2 August 19 82, OAU member nations began to gather
in Tripoli, Libya for the purpose of convening the OAU meet-
ing which had stalled at Nairobi in April. However, by 9
August, the OAU heads of government were forced to reschedule
the summit due to the failure to form a quorum of 34 member
states as stipulated by the OAU Charter. Despite the appeals
of 31 member states present at the meeting, no other states
had arrived to participate. Libyan leader, Omar Qadhdhafi,
who had hoped to be elected chairman of the OAU, replacing
President Daniel Moi of Kenya, was forced to wait until the
so-called Tripoli II OAU summit in November, later that year.
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This signaled to other African leaders that the OAU as a
whole was not necessarily certain that the Libyan leader was
the best choice to represent an organization based on the
rights of self-determination and non-intervention. Due to
Qadhdhafi's backing of rebel forces in Chad as well as those
of the Polisario in the Western Sahara, his election could
have widened rather than mend the split in the Organization.
While this was not one of the expressed reasons for the
failure of the summit, it was certainly an underlying one.
The principle reason for the failure of the conference was
the continued deadlock over the Western Saharan issue; pri-
marily the admission of the SADR as the OAU * s 51st member in
February 19 82. At least one-half of the member states con-
tinued to refuse to recognize the SADR as a full member.
Following this boycott of the OAU Summit in Tripoli
during August of 19 82, Morocco reaffirmed the irrevocable
decisions taken by the Nairobi Summit in June 19 81 and declared
that the admission of the SADR to the OAU was null and void.
AS a result, the OAU itself continued to go through the worst
crisis in its history, with its members evenly split over the
issue of the SADR's admission [Ref. 109].
In November of that same year, the Col. Muamnan al-
Qadhdhafi regime in Tripoli tried a second time to convene
the 19th OAU Summit. Qadhdhafi had hoped to be seated as
the Chairman of the OAU. However, Libyan intervention in
Chad which had escalated during the period between the two
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attempted summits had created a basic split in the Chadian govern-
ment. When delegates began the pre-summit meetings in mid-
November, talks stalled over the question of Chad representa-
tion. Moderate states supported Mr. Habre's delegation while
progressives wanted to seat the Libyan-backed "national
salvation" government of Goukouni Queddei , which was installed
in northern Chad [Ref. 110]. This debate was never solved
and the second attempt of convening the OAU Summit in Tripoli
failed [Ref. Ill]
.
The OAU ' s second failure to convene a summit caused
many observers to speculate that it was about to self-destruct.
Given the divisions that existed; the Western Sahara and
Chad, the prospects for an agreement between member states
that would allow for a quorum to be reached seemed slim to
none. However, by June of 19 83, tensions had died down
enough for a third attempt at convening an OAU summit.
Because of the previous failures at Tripoli, Libya, caused
mostly by the unsettled nature of Libyan politics, the third
attempt was scheduled to be held in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, the
location of the OAU ' s permanent headquarters.
Initially, the meeting was hosted by chairman Daniel
Moi of Kenya. Delegates began arriving on 6 June and immedi-
ately the issue of the Western Sahar arose again. Moi, in
a statement made at the opening of talks, said that "African
leaders will need to act decisively over the Western Sahara
issue in order to overcome the stalemate" [Ref. 112]. Other
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problems were also pressing on the attempts at convening the
summit. Chad, South Africa, and the serious economic problems
facing many of the countries, as well as who was to be seated
as the new chairman, all presented challenges to the repre-
senatives, but none were as pressing as the Western Sahara
issue, which still divided the organization in half.
From the sixth through the ninth of June, the dele-
gates met and debated the Western Sahara issue. They key to
an agreement, both sides felt, was the withdrawal of the SADR
contingent whose earlier presence at the two attempted meet-
ings in Tripoli had instigated the boycotts by Morocco and
its allies. Progressive states, who supported seating the
SADR contingent in the OAU, now believed the future of the OAU
was more important than the Western Saharan issue.
On 9 June 19 83 the SADR contingent, led by Foreign
Minister Ibrahim Hakin, motivated, it's said, "by a desire
to contribute to African unity," agreed to withdraw from the
proceedings. This allowed the OAU to convene for the first
time in almost two years. In protest, Qadhdhafi walked out.
However, no other state followed him out the door. Qadhdhafi
had lost two political battles by this time. The first was
his failure to be seated as the Chairman of the OAU for which
he had been lobbying for several years. Several of the
African delegations were in fact, "concerned that the Libyan
leader, who failed on three separate occasions to preside
over the OAU, would seek revenge, particularly concerning
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Chad, especially since he must feel betrayed by some progres-
sive countries" [Ref. 113]. A random examination of Foreign
Broadcast Information Service reports during the time right
after Qadhdhafi's departure from the Addis Abba OAU Summit
did reveal increased Libyan activity in Chad. Secondly,
Qadhdhafi had supported a losing cause in regard to his
support of the Polisario in Western Sahara. His failure to
force Morocco and other states to accept the SADR as a full
OAU member once again highlighted his earlier failures at
Tripoli. Qadhdhafi by this time had learned a lesson that
many politicans have been forced to absorb, that being that
one must sometimes sacrifice short term personal goals, at
least vocally, in order to achieve even greater objectives.
The 19th OAU Summit finally got under way on 9 June
1983, electing a previously close ally to Libya, President
Mengistu Halle Mariam, Chairman. Recent indications are,
however, that this once close relationship is now strained.
It may be that Qadhdhafi is now envious of Mengistu and his
ability to capture the position he tried so hard, but unsuc-
cesfully to obtain. By 12 June 19 83, delegates had once
again adopted a plan to end the Western Sahara dispute [Ref.
114] .
The plan, much like the one drawn up by Morocco pre-
viously, called for the arrangement of a ceasefire and a
referendum with six months to vote on the issue. The resolu-
tion also envisaged direct negotiations between Morocco and
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the Polisario, and the creation of a peacekeeping force
formed by the United Nations in conjunction with the OAU.
The resolution, however, made no reference to Polisario 's
demand for a withdrawal of Moroccan troops before the referen-
dum was to be held. This omission and the absence of any
mention of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, were seen as
victories for Morocco and defeat for the Polisario and their
staunchest supporter, Libya [Ref. 115]
.
Moroccan officials stated that Rabat welcomed the
resolution in broad terms and would work toward the proposed
referendum in the former Spanish territory [Ref. 116]. By
August 19 83, Morocco had set an implied timetable for the OAU
sponsored referendum on the territory's future by postponing
parliamentary elections until after the poll was taken [Ref.
117] . In a 20 August televised speech, King Hassan reaffirmed
Morocco's commitment to holding the referendum, and claimed
that "anyone seeking to obstruct it was afraid of the results"
[Ref. 118]
.
Moroccan confidence in achieving its goals in the
Western Sahara was further bolstered in mid-August when
Qadhdhafi said that the solution to the Western Sahara prob-
lem should be reached "within the Moroccan framework" [Ref.
119]. This statement followed a visit Qadhdhafi made to
Morocco a week earlier and it marked a fundamental change in
Libya's attitude to the Saharan question. Currently, it
appears that Morocco is strengthening its hold on the Sahara;
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the referendum has yet to be held; and the Polisario con-
tinues its struggle against Moroccan presence.
Damis and others believe that a controlled referendum
may actually be implemented as a means of settling the issue.
Hassan has made it very clear in his public statements that
he views the referendum as the only solution to the problem,
but he refuses to withdraw his army and administration from
the Western Sahara prior to any referendum and has ruled out
discussion with the Polisario Front on any topic. His cur-
rent plan to go ahead with the planned resettlement of the
Dakhla region is firm evidence of his continued interest in
the region [Ref. 120].
In light of what British journalist, Tony Hodges
describes as "The Endless War" [Ref. 121], the Western Sahara
Campaign continues, but not without certain international
interest in the struggle.
3. The Strengthening of Moroccan-U.S . Ties: Its
Implications to the Monarchy
Morocco's decision to press its longstanding claim
to the Western Sahara in 1975 has complicated not only its
relations with neighboring African states but those with its
major Western ally, the United States, as well. From 1976
to 1978, Morocco's use of American-supplied arms in the
Western Saharan War brought official U.S. protests and a partial
arms embargo. This injected much tension into bilateral rela-
tions, aggravated by congressional criticism of Morocco.
However, when the Polisario launched attacks into Morocco in
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1979, President Carter reviewed U.S. arms sales plicy and a
decision was reached to permit the sale of arms that would
later be used in the Western Sahara.
Under the Reagan administration, however, Hassan has
achieved the highest level of support and recognition by the
U.S. of Morocco to date. In May of 19 80, Hassan flew to
Washington for talks with Reagan on May 18-21. He was met
with warmth and appreciation and Reagan's determination to
stand by traditional U.S. allies in the Third World— to
lessen the risks that the more endangered among them, like
King Hassan II, end up suffering the fate of the Shah of Iran
or Anastasio Somoza. On 5 November of 19 80, a new ambassador
to Morocco, Joseph Verner Reed, was appointed. After handing
his credentials to Hassan he promised that "my country will
do its best to be helpful in every way possible. Count on
us. We are with you" [Ref. 122J .
So far, the promises have been kept as evidenced by
U.S. military sales credits to Morocco rising each year since
the Reagan administration assumed office. In 19 80, credits
to Morocco were $25.9 million. In 19 81 they were $34.4 and
by 1982 they had risen to $35.6 million. The proposed 19 83
credits almost doubled the 19 82 commitments to over $100
million. However, this proposal has already run aground due
in part to U.S. domestic problems themselves, but more be-
cause, according to Representative Howard Wolpe, the head
of the House Subcommittee on African Affairs, of its chances
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for "harming U.S. economic interests in Algeria, causing U.S.
diplomatic embarrassment in Africa, endangering the OAU, and
finally, increasing the opportunities for the USSR and Cuba
to assist Polisario in a widening conflict." Furthermore,
the Committee warned, "by encouraging Morocco to sustain
indefinitely an unwinnable war (in which the U.S. has great
experience), U.S. policy may well be contributing to the possi-
bility for sudden radical change in Morocco itself" [Ref.
123] .
The proposed credit was reduced to $50 million of FMS
credits in FY 19 83 due to these arguments. Still, they allowed
for Hassan to purchase the most up-to-date missiles and weapons
Western technology can produce and he remains, due in part
to their availability, the force to be reconed with in the
Western Sahara.
U.S. interest in Morocco is not without a strong
strategic rationale. Morocco lies astride the entrance to
the Mediterranean, one of the most strategic waterways in
the world. It provides port facilities to the U.S. Sixth
Fleet. It also provides transit facilities to the U.S. Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at Moroccan air bases,
aimed at possible problems in the Middle East. An agreement
on providing $250 million in upgrading of these air bases
was also made between the U.S. and Morocco. This amount was
in addition to the FMS credits.
Strategic reasons are not the only ones considered
by Washington in its decision to support Morocco. Hassan
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is viewed as an Arab moderate. He helped initiate the
Egyptian-Israeli contact that culminated in Camp David, and
only reluctantly broke relations with Cairo. Now, after the
return of the Sinai to Egypt, he is trying to bring President
Mubarak's regime out of the basement of the Arab world.
Additionally, Hassan has been a representative of Western
interests in Africa, as shown by his dispatch of Moroccan
troops to Zaire in 19 77 and 19 78 to help quell revolts in the
Shaba province
.
For these reasons, the Reagan administration has been
responsive to Hassan's requests for military aid. The U.S.
may very well fear that Hassan could not survive politically
the erosion of his prestige and following that, would result
in a major reversal in the Saharan dispute. It has therefore
redoubled U.S. military support to Morocco and backed Hassan's
rejection of bilateral talks with the Polisario, while
formally declaring its backing for the OAU ' s efforts to
bring about a ceasefire and a referendum.
This currently is an acceptable situation for Hassan.
Growing U.S. support in the form of military credits has
enabled him to divert much needed domestic monies to the job
of restabilizing the failing Moroccan economy by spending
U.S. money in the form of advanced military armaments to
fight a still very popular war. As long as Moroccans are
employed and have a full stomach, then thoughts of a "greater
Morocco" are acceptable. Through U.S. support in conjunction
j r/O
with other assistance given by the French and Saudi Arabia,
the Hassan regime is still a long way from a total collapse.
For the time being, the prolongment of the Western Saharan
War will ensure continued military and economic aid to
Hassan while continuing the buildup of popular support for
the monarchy. Future excess borrowing, overspending of
loans, and miscalculation of foreign and domestic support
for his Saharan efforts could well spell the end of the dynasty
Fortunately, for himself and Morocco, Hassan is well aware
of this and has reprogrammed his initiatives to further limit
the future possibility of this occurrence.
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V. CONCLUSION
Due to the nature of the current political situation in
Morocco as it has been described in this essay, it is the
author's conclusion that the prospects for significant future
change in the system is slim. The Moroccan monarchy has
established itself as the dominant political force in the
country and will continue to determine the dominant goals
of the society.
This statement is made in lieu of certain situations that
have seen a cyclical reoccurrence in regard to the monarchy,
or the idea of a monarchy, throughout Moroccan history. In
pre-dynastic days monarchs emerged in the form of Berber
Chieftans who ultimately rose up to repulse wave after wave
of countless invaders. The coming of the Arabs and Islam at
first lessened the importance of the monarch. But as time
elapsed, the monarch emerged in the Muslim tradition of one-
man rule, and thereafter ruled by both secular and religious
authority. It was his right to rule because Islam pronounced
it.
The institution of the monarchy continued to grow as did
the elite membership of its following; the makhzan. By 1912,
the monarchy had achieved a relatively autonomous status
owing tribute to no one and facing only limited opposition
to its rule from traditionally tempermental, and imazighan
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natured Berber natives. The coming of the French and coloni-
zation of the country saw the monarchy turn once again to the
role of ruled rather than ruler. The period 1912 to 1953
marked a low point in the status of the monarchy.
As the imazigan nature of the Berber took hold, as did
the teachings of Islam, a true nationalist movement sprang
up in Morocco with the only viable symbol available, the
monarch, as its leader. After decolonization in 1956, the
monarch began once again to establish his supreme right to
rule. Due in part to the prestige that it had achieved as
the symbol of the nationalist movement, the monarchy regained
the status it had lost during the protectorate period and
rose above all the modern political forces that had developed
during the nationalist movement.
Since 19 5 6 the monarchy has continued to survive by care-
ful balancing, juggling and manipulating political parties,
members of the parliament, and state interests; playing one
group off the other, all the while appearing to be the ally
of all. The effects of social and economic modernization have
certainly affected the stability of the monarchy. However,
unlike other monarchies who were undermined by modernization,
the Moroccan monarchy has sought to accommodate and manage
rather than resist modernization. In short, Hassan has
accepted modernization as a reality and adjusted accordingly.
The monarchy today finds itself in economic trouble and
involved in a border dispute that is not only taxing Morocco
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domestically but diplomatically as well. Once again, however,
the monarchy has risen to the challenge and readdressed
itself to both problems and for the time being, maintained
its dominant status. Speculation on its impending demise is
abundant, and certain aspects of its social, political and
economic situation would tend to support this speculation,
but the fact remains that over the centuries, the Moroccan
monarchy has risen time and again against seemingly impossible
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